Alex Rodriguez’s attorneys have, at various times, suggested that he will challenge the outcome of his Biogenesis suspension-related grievance arbitration should he not be satisfied with the result—and that only a result of no suspension will be acceptable. (Update: Arbitrator Fredric Horowitz reduced Rodriguez's sentence, but only to 162 games. A-Rod does plan to appeal to federal court.) In a column in November, I wrote, “Courts grant great deference to labor arbitration and arbitrators under what’s referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy, a series of cases issued by the Supreme Court in 1960.” That is true whether the case involves teamsters in Detroit or Chicago or baseball players in San Diego or New York.
Steve Garvey challenged the arbitrator’s decision in his collusion-related damages case all the way to the Supreme Court. (MLBPA v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 1015 (2001)). He lost. Similarly, any challenge to Arbitrator Frederic Horowitz’s pending award in the Rodriguez matter will be denied as well. Garvey’s case is interesting, however, because the Supreme Court laid out the standard courts must use in reviewing labor arbitration cases based upon prior case law, didn’t really add any new theory, and then applied that standard to a case involving the sport we all know and love.
After the Major League Players Association won its three collusion cases against the Clubs covering the 1985, 1986, and 1987 offseasons, the Union and the Clubs negotiated a global settlement agreement to deal with the question of damages. The league established a $280M fund to be distributed to affected players, and the MLBPA established a “Framework” to evaluate the individual players’ claims.
The Framework required that players who alleged that they had lost contract extensions would receive damages “only in those cases where evidence exists that a specific offer of an extension was made by a club prior to collusion only to thereafter be withdrawn when the collusion scheme was initiated.” There were several other allegations of lost income players could make in order to receive a remedy.
Once the claims were evaluated, the MLBPA recommended a distribution plan for the claims. The Framework also provided that players could ask an arbitrator to review the distribution plan to determine “whether the approved Framework and criteria set forth therein have been properly applied in the proposed Distribution Plan.”
Garvey claimed damages of $3M because he was not extended for the 1988 and 1989 seasons. He presented a 1996 letter from Ballard Smith, former Padres President and CEO (1979-1987), as evidence, stating that before the end of the 1985 season, he had offered Garvey an extension through the 1989 season, but the Padres refused to negotiate with Garvey after collusion began. Incidentally, Garvey retired after his age-38 season in 1987, one in which he played only 27 games and finished with a .211/.231/.276 line.
The arbitrator denied Garvey’s claim, writing, “there exists… substantial doubt as to the credibility of the statements in the Smith letter.” He went on:
The shadow cast over the credibility of the Smith testimony coupled with the absence of any other corroboration submitted by Garvey compels a finding that the Padres declined to extend his contract not because of the constraints of the collusion effort of the clubs but rather as a baseball judgment founded upon age and recent injury history.
Although the District Court rejected Garvey’s claim, the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed that decision, finding that the arbitrator’s refusal to credit Smith’s letter was “inexplicable” and “border(ed) on irrational.” The same arbitrator had previously rejected the owners’ testimony in the underlying collusion case.
The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit’s decision and upheld the arbitrator’s award. Citing Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., which built upon the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court wrote, “Courts are not authorized to review the arbitrator’s decision on the merits despite allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the parties’ agreement. It went on, “when an arbitrator resolves disputes regarding the application of a contract, and no dishonesty is alleged, the arbitrator’s ‘improvident, even silly, factfinding’ does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award.”
While the Circuit found the arbitrator’s refusal to credit Smith’s letter “irrational” and “bizarre,” the Supreme Court wrote, “established law ordinarily precludes a court from resolving the merits of the parties’ dispute on the basis of its own factual determinations, no matter how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision.”
In a footnote, the Supreme Court applied that standard to the Garvey case.
In any event, no serious error on the arbitrator’s part is apparent in this case…. The arbitrator’s explanation for his decision indicates that he simply found Smith an unreliable witness and that, in the absence of corroborating evidence, he could only conclude that Garvey failed to show that the Padres had offered to extend his contract. The arbitrator’s analysis may have been unpersuasive to the Court of Appeals, but his decision is hardly qualified as serious error, let alone irrational or inexplicable error.
The Garvey case came after decades of established law on this very subject. While the 9th Circuit disagreed with the arbitrator’s credibility findings and factual findings, and therefore the result, it was not appropriate for it to put itself in the place of the arbitrator. It was not appropriate to reverse his decision without some proof of misconduct as long as the decision draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
If Alex Rodriguez challenges Arbitrator Horowitz’s decision, he will be subject to the same standard as Garvey. Courts are not permitted to stand in the place of the arbitrator and make credibility and factual findings from afar. As long as the arbitrator does not “dispense his own brand of industrial justice,” no appeal is going to be successful.
Eugene Freedman is Deputy General Counsel for a national labor union.
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I believe Pay$Rod would have to separately seek an injunction, enjoining enforcement of the arbitrator's decision. And, since a party seeking an injunction generally must show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his claim and, as explained above, Pay$Rod has basically zero chance of prevailing on the merits of his claim, it seems unlikely a court would issue an injunction or a stay of the arbitrator's decision...
I agree with UncleChuck regarding the likelihood of obtaining an injunction (slim/none)
Certainly the issue about the likelihood of reversal is the key factor, but Rodriguez's skills are diminishing, and if the decision were reversed after he spend four months not playing, those are four months he can't ever get back, 10 HR he won't hit, etc.
The process that was _agreed to_ is what unfolded. If you want to make an argument that MLB violated some law, that's a different argument, but still not germane to the issue at hand. The arbitration process, as agreed to by the union and MLB, will most assuredly be upheld. The collection of evidence outside of that process, however repugnant to our sensibilities, will not matter to the court.
In other words, how does one determine what is merely "improvident" versus what is "dishonest?" It all seems very nebulous.
Also, thanks for writing these articles. Really enjoyed reading them.
Regarding dishonesty - that would require some kind of proof that he was bribed by one side or other. It's not going to happen in today's day and age with professional arbitrators, especially those of national standing like Horowitz.
If Horowitz decides to uphold MLB's desired 211-game suspension, then, would A-Rod have a case against him given there's no precedent (or written language in the JDA) to justify a first suspension of that length?
FWIW, I don't think he will do that, I'm just curious.
I don't believe you need to prove bribery to get a stay of the suspension in court. If evidence is acquired illegally that evidence cannot be used in a criminal case. I don't see how it would be different in an arbitration.
To get an injunction or a stay of an order, a party must show: (1) that irreparable harm will result from enforcement of the order (which A Rod may be able to show); and (2) a likelihood of being able to prevail on the merits (which A Rod won't be able to show here, unless he can show that arbitrator acted outside of the bounds of the authority the parties contractually provided to him).
To this layman that sounds like the arbitrator came up with his own brand of justice. I'm sure that isn't legally the case - I'm just not following how it isn't.
A-Rod is not a sympathetic character but if I was a player I would be concerned about how this arbitration process works and would question my union regarding whether this process serves the best interests of the players. The process seems to give MLB immunity from every principle regarding ethical and legal behavior in gathering evidence and gives the players no legitimate right to appeal decisions that on the surface look capricious and biased.