In 2012, Mike Trout was the best baseball player. He was so good that his delayed call-up to the Angels—for, it should be noted clearly here, completely non-service time reasons, but legitimate and honest concerns about his ability to produce after a difficult offseason (healthwise) and an interrupted spring training—might have even cost the Angels a spot in the postseason. He was so, so, so, so, so good.
And he entered 2013 with a) options, meaning he could technically have been sent down to the minors and b) 1.070 years of service time, which means that if he had been sent down for (by my math) 24 days, the Angels would have controlled him for an extra season.
Correction: My reading of his service time was wrong. He'd have had to have been sent down for 70 days—that's what the number after the decimal point refers to—which clearly changes the specifics here and moves Trout's case into more of a hypothetical, rhetorical arena. I think you can keep reading the article without harm, but there are substantial differences between the Bryant service time math and the hypothetical Trout service time math. You could also use 2014 Jason Heyward as the stand-in for Trout. Or Jacob deGrom. Thanks, Craig.
This is an article Dave Cameron wrote, probably the best I’ve read breaking down the math and the stakes of the Cubs’ decision with Kris Bryant:
They are in essence trading roughly 10 games of 2015 value in exchange for a full season of Bryant in his prime, and while the Cubs clearly want to win this year, no player is so great that missing 10 games would meaningfully alter a team's expected results. Even Mike Trout, clearly the best player in baseball, is only expected to add about half a win to his team's ledger every 10 games, and Bryant is no Mike Trout. Even an optimistic projection for Bryant would have him adding maybe a quarter of a win to the Cubs' season total if he started in the big leagues versus being held down for a few weeks. Baseball isn't basketball; one guy matters only so much.
You don’t remember this conversation about Mike Trout before the 2013 season, because nobody had this conversation about Mike Trout before the 2013 season. That’s because if you had recommended sending Mike Trout to the minors—the best player in baseball, on a competitive team, after he had just produced a 10-win season—you would have been called a drunkard and a fool. Imagine! Just imagine!
And yet, you’d be making the same case that the Kris-Bryant-To-Triple-A argument depends on: Baseball teams operate on a long timeline, and sometimes reaping large gains later justifies taking smaller hits now, even if it comes at the expense of a player’s seemingly justified earnings.
Why do we consider one conversation acceptable and one unacceptable?
Trout is better than Bryant.
But this basically comes down to that old “We have established what you are, madam” line. It doesn’t matter whether Trout is better than Bryant; it matters whether Bryant is better than the alternatives on the Cubs. If he is, and we still defend his assignment to Triple-A, then we are saying that it is acceptable to send the better player down for service time manipulation. A widely held belief. If we are saying that it is acceptable to send the better player down for service time manipulation, then it would apply wherever it applies—even, potentially, with Trout in 2013.
I haven’t seen anybody really argue that Bryant isn’t better than the alternatives for the Cubs.
Sending down Trout would have cost the Angels more, in present-day performance, than it will likely cost the Cubs.
True! Trout is better, and more likely to produce wins and WARs than Bryant is. But he’s also likely to be better in year seven than Bryant will be, which means the gain at the end of this gambit is greater, as well. And if the math works, and if we're beholden to the math…
It just looks worse.
Ah, and this is it. It looks so much worse to send down Trout. The Cubs have defended a Bryant demotion using plausible—if, to me, unlikely—explanations: He still has work to do (on defense, versatility); and he might suffer from the pressure of being on an Opening Day roster. To the latter we might simply point out that this is what September call-ups are for; to the former we might sniff unimpressedly, and counter that there is always something about a player’s game that a front office could claim needs work. In either case, though, there is plausibility to it; with plausibility, the non-cynical parts of our characters must allow that decisions are complicated and maybe, just maybe, there’s more to it than we see. It also provides defense against more legalistic remedies, like union complaints involving binding arbitration.
But while this last one provides an explanation for why the team feels confident in making the Bryant decision while never entertaining the Trout option, it doesn’t explain why many fans support sending Bryant down but wouldn’t support sending Trout. If we, the fans, can ace the marshmallow test with Bryant, why do we gobble up the now marshmallow with Trout?
This, I don’t know. I’d like to think that, somewhere in our souls, there is a rejection of a do-anything approach to winning. As I wrote about last winter w/r/t the Astros, there is a point where we declare lawyerball to have gone too far. When a player or team figures out a strategy that is distasteful, boring, undefensible, or simply tacky, we change the rules to outlaw it, we (or they) institute unwritten rules that become in their own way binding, or we collectively vote with our wallets and feet. There are likely all sorts of ways a winning-obsessed club could gain small competitive advantages—forfeiting any game in which their win probability dips to zero, for instance, would save the bullpen and prevent injuries—but even winning-obsessed clubs are only comfortable going as far as we let them, or as far as they personally feel ethically justified in doing.
It seems clear to me that this is a rule-following that borders on rule-breaking, except the rule that prevents it hasn’t been written yet (and would likely have its own loopholes, anyway). Nobody likes that clubs can do this, though given that roughly 29 other teams do it we tend to support our teams when they do it, too. The rule could be changed, but in absence of rule changes it’s still within our power as fans to shame clubs for it. I don’t deny that the Cubs are making a smart decision; I don’t deny that, if I were the GM, I would make the same decision; I don’t deny that the Cubs front office should sleep just fine with this move. They might even be irresponsible if they didn’t do this. They are smart!
But, because they are smart, we are unhappy, just like we would be unhappy if they forfeited a game in the fourth inning. The Bryant decision makes baseball worse for us,
woooo go team go! *waves pennant that says COST CONTROL YEARS*
— ken shamrock v kimbo (@weed_mouse) March 30, 2015
it’s an obviously unfair situation for a young man who has had his leverage taken from him for no great reason, and if the loophole were closed it wouldn’t create any significant shift in the competitive balance. It serves nothing. In lieu of a rule change, it’s okay for us to shame teams for it. A Mike Trout demotion was never talked about because to do so would have raised such a shaming that it would have overwhelmed the Angels. How things look matters to these decisions, and how we react matters to how they look. If we quit talking about how smart the Cubs are for this decision and instead complained about how unhappy it makes us, if we shamed them for observing the letter of the law instead of the spirit of the game, this conversation might quit happening. And we’d get what we want.
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Sign him him to a 8 year deal, Problem fixed.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/nationals-journal/post/scott-boras-on-his-nationals-influence-and-stephen-strasburgs-innings-limit/2012/08/23/39c4c3f2-ed61-11e1-9ddc-340d5efb1e9c_blog.html
I can't think of an exact parallel, but if Kris Bryant were a pitcher, Scott Boras wouldn't have any problem with the Cubs limiting his innings*; Boras would, however, have a problem with his assignment to Iowa even though he's better than their fourth starter.
* - And I agree that innings caps seem pretty useless but that's neither here nor there.
The issue really is the CBA. It allows for this type of behavior and until that changes I don't see any reason for clubs not to behave this way. Granted, they need some baseball excuse to send Bryant to the minors, but that is easy enough to do. The MBLPA needs to do a better job in the next negotiating session. The recent article that shows that players are getting a lower percentage of overall revenue in baseball shows that the owners have been winning. The players need to negotiate better.
On the other hand, if he runs into Mike Olt-like struggles, Chicago will be very glad they locked in that extra year of development at team-friendly terms.
This is manufactured spring training drama. Teams signing young players to long-term deals largely makes moot the entire issue of service time manipulation.
Angels fans, baseball fans, etc. would justifiably go crazy if you sent the best player in baseball to the minors. Nobody has any justification to go crazy over a Bryant demotion until he proves himself against major-league pitchers over the course of a full MLB season. One of his fellow demotees is living proof that minor league and spring training numbers don't mean much at the majors.
1 --Theo's ridiculous claim in the press, on the record, that this for developmental reasons, and hey(!), he did the same thing to other players on the Red Sox, so it *must* really be for "baseball reasons."
2 -- Mainstream journalists printing this without calling Theo out overtly for these comments
The funny thing is that I actually blame the union. If the union gave a crap about young players, this system would never exist, and the fans would in a position to actually see the best players play at the MLB level (gasp), rather than having to wait simply because the business of baseball has created a reason to hold prospects back. But instead, the MLBPA (like every other union) has prioritized the needs of its veteran members of its junior members, and in so doing they have given up any semblance of freedom that young plaers have in exchange for other concessions from the owners that benefit veteran players.
Further, as Craig Calcaterra pointed out this morning at Hardball Talk, the MLBPA has negotiated plenty of benefits for all of its members, that apply to all future major leaguers, too. Young players may not have "any semblance of freedom" but they do have guaranteed contracts, an awfully high minimum salary, and the opportunity to earn more guaranteed money - be it through arbitration or a contract extension. Among other things.
There never used to be any such thing as "Super 2" players. Arbitration never started until after the third year.
The players union wanted to do something for the younger players. They tried to move the eligibility for arbitration up a year so that everyone finishing work th two years would qualify. The owners fought that, and the current Super 2 rules resulted from a compromise that allowed only some second year players to qualify for arbitration.
Splitting the second year into two different tiers for the purposes of arbitration brought about the unintended consequences we have today. You don't have to be King Solomon to realize that splitting the baby with a sword was not such a bright idea.
But you are dead wrong to claim the union sold out the younger players. Rather, they gained a partial win to help some of the year two players make more, sooner rather than later.
The clubs have a right to run they club the way they see fit provided it is within the law and the CBA, if any. It's called business. And they don't have to listen to the whinings of a bunch of people who have no skin in the game.
If you hate this "service clock" thing then advocate the MLBPA to give up something else that the teams would rather have.
As a lawyer, I can tell you that the obvious problem with this statement is that Bryant can't take it up with MLBPA. He is not on the 40 man roster, and therefore he is not eligible to join the MLBPA. As a result, neither MLB nor the MLBPA could possibly care less about what he has to say. At the same time, minor league players that are not on the 40 man are bound by the CBA that the MLBPA and MLB have negotiated, despite the fact that they are not a part of either group. While they may seem ridiculously unfair, it is the law as upheld by the 2nd Circuit when the court ruled that Maurice Clarett was ineligible for the NFL draft because he was subject to age restrictions rules in place under the CBA between the NFL and NFLPA despite the fact that he was not eligible to become a member of the NFLPA. See Clarett v. National Football League.
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1177&context=key_workplace
MLB one, and that he will turn into a better MLB player as a result. A person making this argument would likely point to Bryant's defense and his minor league K rates as weaknesses that he needs to work on in the minors. They would also likely point to the psychological aspect of the game and say Bryant might fall short of his ceiling if he is "rushed." (See http://insider.espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/9421798/carlos-gomez-aaron-hicks-risk-rushing-prospects-mlb)
Personally, I think that entire argument is hot garbage and that the concept of prospects being rushed is greatly exaggerated. In my view, as long as they are relatively close, most players who have it in them to be quality MLB players (see e.g., Jose Fernandez) benefit more from the increased challenge of aggressive promotion than from languishing away in the minors while feasting on inferior talent, and potentially even developing bad habits because they aren't being forcing to make adjustments. Conversely, the players who are often cited as falling short of their potential because they were "rushed" (e.g., Aaron Hicks, Jesus Montero, Mike Moustakas) were never going to pan out anyway.
But I do think it's necessary to address the point, nonetheless, particuarly given that this argument is what the Cubs are (disingenuously) citing as their reasoning behind the Bryant decision.
If so it seems they can leave Baez down in the minors for the 60 + 13 days this year they could essentially reset him to the same service time as Bryant as of June 15.
Keeping Baez down may do even more harm to the Cubs than Bryant.
First. The angels won 86 and 89 games in 2011 and 2012, respectively.
They were already a very good team.
The Cubs, no secret, have been awful and still were last year. Now I'm a Cubs fan so I'm as optimistic as the next guy about 2015, but that's all it is- optimism.
The following positions are still big question marks for the Cubs: LF, RF, 3B, 2B.
They are also carrying 3 catchers, limiting their bench and/or bullpen (they will have only one lefty reliever). Their bench is almost 100% unproven.
And we don't even know what position Bryant will play when called up.
Furthermore, you're comparing a true 5 tool player to a 3 tool player (arguably an optimistic assessment as there's plenty of scouts who doubt his hit tool)
So it's only fair to put each player in his proper context.
Adding a player who does everything amazingly well to a very competitive team.
Vs
Adding a player we expect to be very good, but still has some obvious weaknesses to his game to a team that is still likely only the 3rd best in the division. (And one could argue that even a very optimistic view of the 2015 Cubs is still only 3rd best)
And a pessimist would point out that the Reds are only 3 years removed from a division title and are better right nowvthan the Cubs.
IF ANYTHING, the more apt comparison to Trout is:
If the Cubs are playing well in August, and in the hunt, do they call up Addison Russell?
(Obvious stipulation that Russell continues on his current career arc applies)
I don't entirely buy the development argument, but you can't just discount it. There is obviously a business aspect to it in delaying the service clock. The same as there is a business aspect when he reaches arbitration and Boras tries everything in his power to break the bank. The Cubs aren't a good example as they are a big market team, but "little" things like an extra year of control are a big deal to a lot of clubs. But, when they try to take advantage of a rule they are villified.
Let's really boil this down to dollars and cents. What does delaying his promotion by one month do to Kris Bryant? He'll still reach arbitration a year early as a super two. At that point, assuming he pans out, he'll make millions per year. Dexter Fowler is making almost $10M (if my memory serves me correctly) as an arbitration case. A successful Bryant will make far more. The only impact to him is that he has to wait one more year before he goes and tries to get his $200M payday. I'm sorry if I don't feel sorry for him.
Whether Blowhard Boras thinks it impacts things; it doesn't. Bryant (as with all top-flight prospects) knows that he is needed on the team, and a valued member of their future.
Why do you imagine that people forget when their employer drops on them? People surely remember.
All that being said, as a Cardinal fan, I feel that I'm morally obliged to note that the Cardinals, in a similar situation, made the decision to bring Albert Pujols north in 2001, when he played 161 games, won the NL RoY Award, finished 4th in MVP voting, and led a 93 win team to the playoffs. . .