As a recap, here’s my original piece on PER (or Payroll Efficiency Rating), followed up by some adjustments, and then the first part of this series two weeks ago.
Now, before we get to the rankings, let’s run down some issues that seem to have gotten lost in translation since this system was first introduced in August:
How is this not just dollars/win? There are two major adjustments factored in here that make it “better” than a simple dollars/win calculation. The first is each team’s unique revenue-earning potential. Since the Yankees make far more money per win than the Marlins do, it makes perfect economic sense that the Yankees should also spend more per win.
The second major adjustment involves the marginal revenue curve, introduced by Nate Silver in Baseball Between the Numbers. Since all wins are not created equal (going from 88 to 92 is far more valuable than going from 64 to 68), we factor this into the revenue estimates. Combined with each team’s earning potential, and adjusting for “baseball inflation,” we can guess how much marginal revenue each team will likely bring in. We then weigh that against how much they shouldhave brought in, had they won as many games as their payroll alone would have predicted. (Check out my article from two weeks ago for a fuller example.)
Are large-market GMs being penalized? Since GMs are being judged only within the context of their own market, the system puts large-market and small-market GMs on a pretty even playing field. If there appears to be a bias (i.e., if it seems like there are more large-market GMs on the bottom), it’s probably due to real-world trends; out of necessity, small-market teams have been more likely to hire stats-savvy GMs, who have tended to be toward the top of these lists. Large-market teams, meanwhile, are responsible for some of the biggest flameouts in the database, such as the A-Rod-era Rangers, the 2001-03 Mets, and the 2008 Tigers.
Why does it only use third-order wins and not include the postseason? This was a personal choice. Unless we can find a really significant way to predict W3–W or post-season success (Nate’s Secret Sauce is a nice tool, but it’s not quite there), W3 gives us the best way to evaluate a team’s performance.
Now, moving to the rankings. You can find the entire data set here. Only GMs with three or more years on the job in the ’90s are considered. Starting with the bottom:
GM | Teams | Years | PER |
10. Sandy Alderson | Athletics | 1990-97 | 0.905 |
9. Ed Lynch | Cubs | 1995-99 | 0.904 |
8. Fred Claire | Dodgers | 1990-98 | 0.903 |
7. Bob Gebhard | Rockies | 1993-99 | 0.889 |
6. Herk Robinson | Royals | 1991-99 | 0.879 |
Alderson is probably a surprise here, since he is known as the godfather of the modern sabermetric-savvy GMs, but the record is what it is, the A’s had a lot of bad years in the ’90s, and they spent far more on payroll than they really needed to.
GM | Teams | Years | PER |
5. Walt Jocketty | Cardinals | 1995-99 | 0.868 |
4. Gord Ash | Blue Jays | 1995-99 | 0.858 |
3. Gene Michael | Yankees | 1991-95 | 0.822 |
2. Al Rosen | Giants | 1990-92 | 0.713 |
1. Lou Gorman | Red Sox | 1990-93 | 0.680 |
Jocketty is the one that stands out in this group, since he was fifth-best of the ’00s. There’s an amazingly clear divide between his first five years with the Cardinals (’95-’99) and his last eight, which I guess makes sense, when you consider that Jim Edmonds arrived in 2000, Albert Pujols in 2001, and Scott Rolen in 2002.
As for the others, Ash never really had any success with the Blue Jays, Rosen quit just in time for the Giants to get Barry Bonds, and Gorman did a pretty terrible job with the Red Sox in his last few years. Michael probably wouldn’t be on the list if he had held on a couple more years becuase he legitimately rebuilt the Yankees in the early ’90s, and his last year as GM (1995) was the first of 13 straight that the team would make the postseason. Of course, they really didn’t need a top-tier payroll before then, which is why he’s here.
And now for the best:
GM | Teams | Years | PER |
10. Jim Bowden | Reds | 1993-99 | 1.120 |
9. Dan Duquette | Expos, Red Sox | 1992-99 | 1.149 |
8. Andy MacPhail | Twins | 1990-94 | 1.152 |
7. John Hart | Indians | 1991-99 | 1.152 |
6. Bob Watson | Astros, Yankees | 1994-97 | 1.163 |
Hart is an obvious one here, as he took a small-market team without much of a history of success and turned it into a powerhouse. Watson and MacPhail also make plenty of sense since both led World Series-winning teams, MacPhail with the Twins and Watson with the Yankees. Also, I guess there was a reason that Bowden and Duquette kept their jobs for so long, before ultimately flaming out in the ’00s.
GM | Teams | Years | PER |
5. Kevin Towers | Padres | 1996-99 | 1.188 |
4. John Schuerholz | Royals, Braves | 1990-99 | 1.214 |
3. Brian Sabean | Giants | 1997-99 | 1.233 |
2. Gerry Hunsicker | Mets, Astros | 1991-92, 1996-99 | 1.238 |
1. Kevin Malone | Expos, Dodgers | 1994-95, 1999 | 1.243 |
Malone is on top almost by coincidence since he happened to be the guy that took over the Expos in 1994, which turned out to be the best individual season of the entire decade (see below). He then executed the team’s fire sale before resigning the following year, and he went on to have a miserable run with the Dodgers from 1999-2001.
The others make more sense, although I’m sure it pains a good amount of you to see Sabean once again near the top. (Blame Bonds … again.) Schuerholz certainly needs no explanation, nor does Towers, who took the Padres to the World Series in 1998. Hunsicker was in the top five of the ’00s as well, although he had a slightly more interesting go of it in the ’90s. His run with the Astros was terrific, just as it was this past decade, but he was also in charge of the Bobby Bonilla-era Mets.
Now for the best and worst individual seasons:
GM | Team | Year | PER |
278. Fred Claire | Dodgers | 1992 | 0.53 |
277. Sandy Alderson | Athletics | 1991 | 0.54 |
276. Gerry Hunsicker | Mets | 1992 | 0.55 |
275. Gord Ash | Blue Jays | 1995 | 0.55 |
274. Lou Gorman | Red Sox | 1992 | 0.56 |
— | — | — | — |
10. John Schuerholz | Braves | 1991 | 1.61 |
9. Bob Quinn | Giants | 1993 | 1.65 |
8. Gerry Hunsicker | Astros | 1999 | 1.65 |
7. Gerry Hunsicker | Astros | 1997 | 1.69 |
6. John Hart | Indians | 1995 | 1.73 |
5. Lee Thomas | Phillies | 1993 | 1.73 |
4. John Hart | Indians | 1994 | 1.75 |
3. Gerry Hunsicker | Astros | 1998 | 1.98 |
2. Jim Bowden | Reds | 1999 | 2.07 |
1. Kevin Malone | Expos | 1994 | 2.07 |
And the best- and worst-run teams overall:
Team |
GMs |
PER |
30. Royals | John Scheurholz (1990), Herk Robinson (1991-99) | 0.850 |
29. Dodgers | Fred Claire (1990-98), Kevin Malone (1999) | 0.874 |
28. Cubs | Jim Frey (1990-91), Larry Himes (1992-94), Ed Lynch (1995-99) | 0.876 |
27. Yankees | Harding Peterson (1990), Gene Michael (1991-95), Bob Watson (1996-97), Brian Cashman (1998-99) | 0.883 |
26. Rockies | Bob Gebhard (1993-99) | 0.889 |
— | — | — |
5. Pirates | Larry Doughty (1990-91), Ted Simmons (1992-93), Cam Bonifay (1994-99) | 1.145 |
4. D’backs | Joe Garagiola (1998-99) | 1.200 |
3. Expos | Dave Dombrowski (1990-91), Dan Duquette (1992-93), Kevin Malone (1994-95), Jim Beattie (1996-99) | 1.223 |
2. Braves | Bobby Cox (1990), John Schuerholz (1991-99) | 1.244 |
1. Astros |
Bill Wood (1990-93), Bob Watson (1994-95), Gerry Hunsicker (1996-99) | 1.331 |
Once again, here’s the full data.
Thank you for reading
This is a free article. If you enjoyed it, consider subscribing to Baseball Prospectus. Subscriptions support ongoing public baseball research and analysis in an increasingly proprietary environment.
Subscribe now
He traded for Jeff Kent before the 97 season, and Kent was good in '97 and great in '98/'99. Sabean also didn't do anything monumentally stupid during that time.
Hell, even trading for J.T. Snow before the 97 season turned out well in 97 and 99.
Other positive moves: Getting Nen during the Marlins fire sale, getting Ellis Burks, the white flag trade with the White Sox.
The biggest criticism of him during this period would be the poor quality of the draft picks. Of course, it turned out to be a decent strategy because they were always flipping those poor picks for decent veterans.
Apparently no one here can ctr-c.
Of the '90s draft picks, Chipper was the #1 overall pick in '90, and Andruw Jones was an awesome international signing in '93. Schuerholz did a good job of plugging in holes where he had to (especially in the bullpen and 1B), but he should still share the '90s success with Cox.
Ubba grubba grooby dooby dip dip fa-tang sum-bubba doogie doogie doogie. Ju hubba hubba nooby faloopa. Buggy buggy buggy buggy. Hip hip hip hip mugga mugga mugga mugga.
I'm sorry, my brain exploded. I could not grok this.
The system needs further tinkering. The Pirates coming out as the 5th-best run franchise of the 90s just looks, smells, sounds and feels SO wrong;
or the system needs further explanation as to what it's measuring and what it's NOT measuring. Seems to me all it's doing is estimating how well teams managed payroll without affecting the won-loss record too adversely. In the very short run. Only one aspect of general managing a baseball team.
Remember that the Littlefield Pirates were fifth worst of the 2000s, if I'm remembering right.
Those late 90s teams also had some upside, but they had the propensity of extending the contracts on the wrong players (i.e. Kevin Young) or signing the wrong free agents (i.e. Pat Meares). Those bad moves spiraled out of control once they hit the 2000s.
Basically the point I'm getting at is that I think any system to evaluate a GM that doesn't properly account for minor league success and development fails to grasp an enormous part of a GM's role.
This is a great idea and I hope you continue to develop your model but there needs to be a much more complete picture of both the inputs (retention and development of homegrown players) and the outcomes (pennants and World Series) of franchise success before any non-esoteric claims about GM performance can be made.
the 'inputs' for the players into the teams' systems unless they happened during the same decade or under the same GM
So the Yankee GM pays $5M per marginal win to outbid the small-market GM (who can only pay a max of $4M without actually losing money per marginal win). If you do strict "expenditure per marginal win", then the Yankee GM comes out weaker every time even though he's succeeding in making money for his team.
I don't think that any study that shows the Yankees as one of the 5 worst run franchises of the 90's, with the Pirates as one of the best, is showing what it thinks it is showing. More precisely, the conclusion that payroll efficiency is the sole way to evaluate how good a team is run seems to be missing something.
Just like the last article, this seems to ignore the long-term effects a GM can have on the front office mindset, farm system, draft, resource allocation. It also ignores the ages of the players involved on those teams and their production along their career path.
Why on earth should Kevin Malone get credit for inheriting a team with Pedro Martinez, Larry Walker, Marquis Grissom, and Moises Alou, just to name a few?
It'd be like if somebody took over for Brian Cashman in 2010 then everybody crediting him with a 97-win season for the Yankees.
It just seems the list has more to do with how lucky a GM was than how well they performed. Did they happen to be GMing a team when it happened to win, etc.
Perhaps in cases of "split off-seasons" like this one (and there are no doubt many others), you can split the credit or blame for the subsequent season's results?