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SEATTLE MARINERS Team Audit | Player Cards | Depth Chart |
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Signed P-L George Sherrill to a one-year deal worth $1.1 million plus incentives. [12/17]
Sherrill’s return to Seattle is nice in at least three ways. One, it represents a reunion between a player and the organization that discovered, appreciated, and cultivated his talents. Recall that Sherrill bounced around to three different independent league teams over five seasons before signing with the Mariners. From there, he reached the majors in his second season with the organization before being traded to the Orioles in the Erik Bedard trade. Sherrill has pitched for two other teams since—the Dodgers and Braves—and now returns to the Mariners as a soon-to-be 35-year-old.
Another reason for Seattleites to embrace Sherrill is his performance. Ben Lindbergh wrote about Dontrelle Willis’s nascent conversion to the bullpen last week and included the table below. Said table shows the performances of the lefties who faced the highest percentage of same-handed batters last season in 20-plus innings. Sherrill is included, and by multi-year True Average appears to be one of the better lefty-killing options out there:
Name |
% 2011 PA vs. LHBP |
2011 |
Multi |
72 |
.155 |
.178 |
|
67 |
.292 |
.236 |
|
65 |
.248 |
.241 |
|
64 |
.234 |
.235 |
|
64 |
.293 |
.264 |
|
61 |
.226 |
.226 |
|
54 |
.191 |
.208 |
|
George Sherrill |
54 |
.226 |
.213 |
Josh Spence |
54 |
.204 |
.204 |
52 |
.221 |
.219 |
|
Dontrelle Willis |
18 |
.149 |
.191 |
The Mariners went without a true left-handed specialist last season. Erik Bedard, a starter, posted the staff’s best TAv against southpaws, at a .265 clip. Aaron Laffey, the team’s primary left-handed reliever, saw his TAv against lefties finish at .300. Seattle is unlikely to compete in 2012, but Sherrill will be an upgrade during the time he’s there; should all else fail, he might fetch a more youthful arm from a contender at the deadline.
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PHILADELPHIA PHILLIES Team Audit | Player Cards | Depth Chart |
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Signed SS-S Jimmy Rollins to a three-year deal worth $33 million with a vesting option for a fourth year worth $11 million. [12/17]
Ruben Amaro’s greatest strength as a general manager has been the Phillies’ ability to act as a financial brute. Amaro is a greenback bull let loose in a superstar store. He stampedes through the market, plodding headlong into big deal after big deal, all the while running up an impressive bill. However, the Rollins deal is different from the typical Amaro big-ticket signing. Strong financial backing contributed to retaining the shortstop, of course, but Amaro also showed some uncharacteristic restraint.
Rollins stated his desire to sign a five-year deal all along. And all along, it felt like some team—whether it be the Giants, Tigers, Phillies, or an unexpected bidder—would give one to him. After the Phillies added Jonathan Papelbon, it seemed more likely that said team would reside outside of Philadelphia. However, another serious buyer never materialized, and Amaro never gave in. The two sides instead agreed to a compromise, with Rollins likely staying in Philadelphia for the next four seasons, as the vesting option’s trigger is said to be easily attainable.
The stand Amaro took was not without risk. Finding an alternative to Rollins, either via trade or free agency, would have proved difficult. Proceeding with the in-house option, Freddy Galvis, might have seemed plausible, but only if you didn’t look too closely at Galvis’s career minor-league line (.246/.292/.321). Galvis is a wicked defender, but given the team’s gaudy expenditures and expectations, throwing a 22-year-old, glove-only shortstop into the fire made no sense.
As a result, Rollins returns, bringing his .255/.316/.402 slash line since 2009 with him. By now, the Phillies know what to expect from Rollins. He hits better than the average shortstop, including double-digit home runs in seven straight seasons in which he received 500-plus at-bats, and he has an 82 percent success rate on stolen bases over the past three seasons. Depending on the defensive metric, Rollins rates as either average or a tick above or below. Adjust his overall value as you see fit, but Rollins is clearly the best option the built-to-win, not-built-to-last Phillies had.
On a trivial note, can you believe that Rollins’s most recent All-Star appearance came in 2005? That in spite of the Phillies’ popularity and success—meaning Charlie Manuel has managed the National League team twice since that season—and Rollins’s personal achievements. Major awards can and do lie about a player’s value, but how many times does a player win three Gold Gloves, a Silver Slugger award, and a Most Valuable Player award before earning another All-Star bid?
Now, on to the really important matter: when the Phillies signed Papelbon, they raised their 2014 salary commitments to the $80 million mark. Add in Rollins’s presumed $11 million, and the Phillies are on the books for $91 million to five players (Roy Halladay, Cliff Lee, Ryan Howard, Papelbon, and Rollins), with Cole Hamels, Shane Victorino, Chase Utley, Carlos Ruiz, and Hunter Pence all heading towards free agency over the next two winters. Who knows what will become of this bunch in two or three years, but for now, they are rightfully doing all they can to achieve five more champagne showers as a group—even if it means winning a staredown with a fan favorite.
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right? ;-)
1) win one of four wild-card spots
2) win play-in game
3) win LDS
4) win LCS
5) win WS
How *do* teams treat winning a wild-card? Do they have the typical "cover the locker room with plastic celebration," or is it only if you win the Division?
And when did this tradition start, anyway?
I hate defensive metrics.
Besides, what is wrong with Jimmy Rollins being rated defensively as average at SS?
I hate them because they rarely coincide with the commentary section in the BP Annuals.
I hate them because FRAA, UZR and all the other fun ones don't often agree with each other.
I hate them because people think they are accurate enough to actually use them to form opinions about player defense.
I hate them because they are so imprecise and disagree with each other so frequently that lines like "Depending on the defensive metric, Rollins rates as either average or a tick above or below" must be included so readers know that more than one metric is looked at.
I hate that no one really knows why Rollins is a tick above in one metric and a tick below in another metric.
And I hate that all of these defensive metric disclaimers, addendums and alterations result in a very wordy way to attempt to state scientifically what is merely nothing more than an opinion that Rollins appears to be average.
Rollins had a 3.8 FRAA in 2003 and a -15.9 FRAA in 2004. For his career he's -45.6 FRAA but he's had a peak as high as 6.3 FRAA
Is a -45.6 caeer FRAA sound like an average fielder? How does one go from 3.8 FRAA to -15.9 without losing a leg? What does FRAA (or UZR or the other defensive metrics) really say?
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=15699