The game has changed. These four words have been bandied about in 2017 nearly as much as the terms launch angles, exit velocity, and juiced balls. Whether by the more traditional beat writers or the analytics-oriented scribes, the impact of the home run, increased pitch velocity, and defensive shifting have been covered to death. However, some aspects of how “the game has changed” have not been discussed nearly as much, if at all.
The 1985 World Series featured a team with 314 stolen bases, the NL record in the live ball era, second only to the Athletics’ 341 steals in 1976. The Cardinals lost that World Series in seven games to the Royals. Don Denkinger’s blown call at first base in the ninth inning of Game 6 is well traversed terrain, but a significant reason the Cardinals lost is that despite their in-season success swiping bags they could only muster two stolen bases against the Royals. Vince Coleman, who stole 110 bases that year, missed the series thanks to a freak injury during the NLCS, as an automated tarp rolled over his leg and knocked him out of commission.
Thirty-two years later, the World Series features two teams that stole a combined 175 bases during the regular season. The stolen base hasn’t been eliminated from the baseball lexicon, but the perceived value of the steal has diminished. While it is oversimplification to say teams are waiting for the three-run home run, there is no doubt that the dip in steals and drop in non-pitchers’ sacrifice bunts has made the game less strategic and more reliant on conventional offense to win. It is much more difficult to get a free taco from a national fast food chain than it used to be.
After 1, Matthew Trueblood observed:
“In October, we spend too much time and energy talking about managers. We sharpen our focus on every decision they make, until we find that it’s possible to argue against almost every move they make. We harp on the same analytical hobby horses over and over, fit the facts to our preconceived ideas about optimal strategies, and generally get lazy. The number of times we criticize a skipper for letting his pitcher hit in the middle innings, letting him face the opposing batting order for a third time, or using anyone other than his relief ace at some non-traditional high-leverage juncture far exceeds the number of times that second-guessing (or even first-guessing) is actually justified.”
Trueblood’s right. But in a game where the bunt is on its way to becoming a museum piece and nearly everything is station-to-station, this doesn’t leave much for process-oriented analysts to digest.
The first five innings of Game 4 were a scoreless affair with a no-hitter on one side of the ledger, as Alex Wood didn’t allow a hit until George Springer’s home run with two outs in the sixth. Yet even in a contest where it felt like one run could be the difference maker, both squads barely tried to advance runners and grind for the extra base. A botched Chris Taylor delayed steal ended the first inning. A successful hit-and-run in the top of the sixth against Charlie Morton moved Austin Barnes to third base on an Enrique Hernandez single. Beyond this, there were few attempts to either steal bases (in the Astros’ case) or bunt for a hit to get something going against Morton (in the Dodgers’ case).
A common lament in 2017 is that baseball is broken because the pace is too slow and the games are too damn long. There is truth in this statement, but there is a more valid complaint lurking beneath this surface observation. For some, it feels like there is something missing when there isn’t as much batted ball contact and when fielders aren’t nearly as involved as they used to be. Even defensive shifting dilutes some of the drama, taking away cheap hits that led to more baserunners and action both in the field and on the bases.
This isn’t a “get off my lawn” observation. Defensive shifts and pitch framing are a joy to watch for rapt viewers of the game. But for more casual fans tuning in for the first time in weeks, months, or perhaps even all season, seeing the successful implementation of a strategy that leads to a ground out to Jose Altuve in the middle of right field isn’t the most satisfying outcome.
If we follow Trueblood’s advice to the letter much of the tactical analysis of Game 4 is rendered useless. Wood and Morton were both dealing, yet many people on social media were all banging the same familiar drum about how managers A.J. Hinch and Dave Roberts should have pulled their starters sooner.
While questions about leaving Morton and Wood in seem silly even with the benefit of hindsight, it is fair to wonder about Hinch and his continued use of his in-season closer. Ken Giles didn’t have it, and hasn’t had it for nearly the entirety of the postseason. While the rationale that the best version of Giles will win you this game and this series makes sense on some level, on another, more immediate level at some point the time comes to surrender to the realities on the ground.
But for Giles to blow the game it requires the players standing in the box to play their role and put the game away. Before the game even started Cody Bellinger–who had been struggling of late and looked like he had been using a wet blanket instead of a wooden bat–made an adjustment that changed the course of the game and perhaps the entire series.
“I hit every ball in BP today to the left side of the infield,” Bellinger told Brian McTaggart of MLB.com. “I’ve never done that before in my life. Usually I try to lift. I needed to make an adjustment and saw some results today. I needed to make an adjustment, and so I decided I’m hitting every ball to left field today. I had two balls to left field today in the game and I saw some results, so let’s see.”
Bellinger’s second hit of the night, a ringing opposite-field double on an inside-out swing, gave the Dodgers their first lead of the game in the ninth inning and chased Giles. But it was another oft-struggling Dodger, outfielder Joc Pederson, who put the game away.
Entering the season with high expectations and a PECOTA projection that saw big things for him for the second year in a row, Pederson disappeared for the first four months of 2017 and was replaced by Curtis Granderson after the Grandyman was acquired from the Mets. But even after he was banished to the bench and the minors, Pederson quietly made a swing adjustment in August that paid dividends in October.
Joc Pederson has changed his swing. Looks like Corey Seager or Chase Utley may have given him a few pointers pic.twitter.com/WzJ7zSG6bH
— Kenny Ducey (@KennyDucey) August 19, 2017
He isn’t one of the team’s “official” hitting coaches, but Triple-A coach Shawn Wooten works with the younger Dodgers hitters whenever they hit a snag. In August, Wooten noticed that Pederson’s swing was too erect and rigid, so he worked with him to get the young slugger to bend more at the knees. Last night, the reward came through in the form of a three-run jack that put the game out of reach and made what could have been an exciting bottom of the ninth inning into an anticlimactic one, giving Los Angeles an “easy” Game 4 win.
BOOM! YUNG JOC.@Dodgers take the 6-1 lead in the 9th. https://t.co/1i2o5tD0Fx
— FOX Sports: MLB (@MLBONFOX) October 29, 2017
The game on the field in 2017 is vastly different from what is was 1985, that year when the Cardinals stole 314 bases and that decade when Whitey Herzog’s Redbirds made the World Series on three separate occasions on the strength of their collective legs. But the behind-the-scenes work players like Pederson and Bellinger put in to register the big hits and manufacture the larger-than-life moments that permit us to collectively gasp and celebrate their bat flips and home run trots happened then as they happened now.
In-game process matters, and can and certainly should be analyzed. But it isn’t always sub par managing and questionable decision-making that pushes teams to defeat. Some victories are earned, and it is the work and dedication of the players on the other side of the ball that lifts a team to victory, and in this instance one game closer to a team’s first World Series title in nearly three decades.
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