“I’ve never really bunted early. I’m going to run, hit-and-run, steal, double steal, but I don’t like idea of bunting early in game. Late in game with a 3-2 lead, 4-2 lead, you get the first couple of runners on, you’re looking to tack on, I like the bunt then.”
—Cubs manager Lou Piniella showing his affection for the double steal
As I was perusing my copy of Baseball Prospectus 2007 in the warm Arizona sun while waiting for a Rangers workout to begin, I ran across this little ditty in the manager comment on the Angel’s Mike Scioscia: “His MLB-leading 13-for-13 success rate on double steals last year was a nice turn.” Indeed. And as comments like this will do, it spawned questions ranging from how frequently other managers employed the double steal, to just what the success rate of double steals is, to whether the frequency and success rate changed over time, and, finally, to exactly how beneficial the double steal is from a Run Expectancy standpoint.
All good questions, the answers for which I could only approximate at the time. Well, a week after returning from the desert I devoted a few blissful hours to all-things-double (or should I say multiple) steals. What follows are the fruits of that labor.
The Managers
Although the observation relating to Scioscia’s fondness for the double steal was contained in the manager’s comment, we didn’t present the attempts and successes for each manager in the manager stat section of the book. So without further ado, here are the 2006 results.
2006 Double Steals Sorted by Attempts
Team Manager Succ Att Pct LAA Mike Scioscia 13 13 1.000 CIN Jerry Narron 10 12 0.833 NYA Joe Torre 8 9 0.889 NYN Willie Randolph 7 7 1.000 WAS Frank Robinson 4 7 0.571 CHN Dusty Baker 5 6 0.833 DET Jim Leyland 4 6 0.667 FLO Joe Girardi 5 6 0.833 MIL Ned Yost 5 6 0.833 MIN Ron Gardenhire 3 6 0.500 ARI Bob Melvin 4 5 0.800 BAL Sam Perlozzo 5 5 1.000 SLN Tony LaRussa 4 5 0.800 CHA Ozzie Guillen 2 4 0.500 KCA Buddy Bell 4 4 1.000 LAN Grady Little 3 4 0.750 TBA Joe Maddon 2 4 0.500 TOR John Gibbons 2 4 0.500 COL Clint Hurdle 3 3 1.000 SEA Mike Hargrove 3 3 1.000 SFN Felipe Alou 3 3 1.000 ATL Bobby Cox 2 2 1.000 PIT Jim Tracy 1 2 0.500 TEX Buck Showalter 2 2 1.000 CLE Eric Wedge 0 1 0.000 HOU Phil Garner 0 1 0.000 OAK Ken Macha 1 1 1.000 PHI Charlie Manuel 1 1 1.000 SDN Bruce Bochy 0 1 0.000 BOS Terry Francona 0 0 0.000
In addition to Scioscia, Jerry Narron was successful calling for the double steal (10 times in 12 attempts), while the pair of managers from New York did well with 8-for-9 and 7-for-7 performances. For managers with more than four attempts, only Ron Gardenhire was as low as 50% with his 3-for-6 showing. Historically he’s done better than that, and was 19-for-25 from 2002 through 2005.
It should be noted that a successful double-steal attempt is one in which more than one stolen base is recorded and all runners are safe. In the event that any runner is thrown out, the attempt is marked as a failure. Of course, there are attempts, such as the “delayed double steal” when the runner on first draws a throw in order to buy time for the runner from third to score, that are “successful” despite the fact that the runner on first may be put out. Still, we’re counting those as failed attempts for the purposes of the first two sections of this article. On a related note, some readers may not be aware but under rule 10.08(d) other runners are not credited with stolen bases when one runner is caught stealing.
It’s also the case that here I’m looking at double-steal attempts and not the sum total of stolen bases and caught stealing that make up those attempts. Accounting under that alternate method would result in percentages that are much higher since two or more stolen bases are credited on successes and typically only one caught stealing is debited on a failure. For example, in 2006 the success rate for double-steal attempts from the table above was 79.7% (106 for 133) while overall that constituted 212 stolen bases and 27 caught stealing (88.7%).
The table above brings up a question. Which manager has been the most successful in a single season and over time?
Looking at data since 1970 and excluding 1999, the unquestioned leader in this category is Terry Collins and the 1996 Astros.
That season, Collins’ charges were an excellent 20-of-23 in double-steal attempts with Craig Biggio picking up 12 stolen bases in 14 attempts, Jeff Bagwell a perfect 8-for-8, and Derek Bell 7-for-7. It appears Collins was warming up to that 1996 season, having attempted just eight double steals in his first season with the Astros in 1994 (with seven successes) and then nine successes in 16 attempts in 1995. He didn’t show near the same aggressiveness when he moved to the American League with the Angels as he accumulated just five attempts (four successes) in his first two seasons as their manager in 1997 and 1998. All of those managers with 15 or more attempts are shown in the following table (all attempts for a season are credited to a manager even if he managed only part of the season).
Year Team Manager Succ Att Pct 1980 OAK Billy Martin 15 28 0.536 1996 HOU Terry Collins 20 23 0.870 1992 MIL Phil Garner 16 23 0.696 1992 LAN Tommy Lasorda 14 22 0.636 1982 OAK Billy Martin 17 21 0.810 1993 MON Felipe Alou 14 20 0.700 1995 CIN Davey Johnson 12 20 0.600 1989 OAK Tony LaRussa 16 19 0.842 1976 OAK Chuck Tanner 16 19 0.842 1985 SLN Whitey Herzog 13 19 0.684 1988 SLN Whitey Herzog 16 18 0.889 1995 OAK Tony LaRussa 14 18 0.778 1997 CIN Ray Knight 13 18 0.722 Jack McKeon 1989 MIL Tom Trebelhorn 13 17 0.765 1995 COL Don Baylor 11 17 0.647 1997 SLN Tony LaRussa 10 17 0.588 1989 MON Buck Rodgers 8 17 0.471 1987 SLN Whitey Herzog 14 16 0.875 1978 PIT Chuck Tanner 13 16 0.813 1992 OAK Tony LaRussa 11 16 0.688 2001 SEA Lou Piniella 11 16 0.688 1997 HOU Larry Dierker 10 16 0.625 1980 SDN Jerry Coleman 10 16 0.625 1997 COL Don Baylor 10 16 0.625 1987 MON Buck Rodgers 10 16 0.625 1995 HOU Terry Collins 9 16 0.563 1986 MON Buck Rodgers 9 16 0.563 1993 CLE Mike Hargrove 8 16 0.500 1988 CIN Tommy Helms 14 15 0.933 Pete Rose 1983 OAK Steve Boros 13 15 0.867 1970 LAN Walter Alston 12 15 0.800 1991 OAK Tony LaRussa 10 15 0.667 1991 MON Buck Rodgers 10 15 0.667 1991 MON Tom Runnells 6 15 0.400 Buck Rodgers
From an aggregate perspective, Tony LaRussa called for the most double steals since 1970 and by a large margin with 219 while Sparky Anderson finished a distant second at 170 as shown in the table below for managers with 50 or more attempts.
Manager Years Succ Att Pct Tony LaRussa 28 160 219 0.731 Sparky Anderson 26 125 170 0.735 Joe Torre 24 111 165 0.673 Lou Piniella 18 111 160 0.694 Billy Martin 17 102 151 0.675 Tommy Lasorda 21 91 151 0.603 Buck Rodgers 14 76 145 0.524 Whitey Herzog 18 112 141 0.794 Mike Hargrove 14 87 124 0.702 Tom Kelly 15 75 111 0.676 Chuck Tanner 19 72 103 0.699 Jim Leyland 14 67 101 0.663 Dick Williams 18 68 95 0.716 Bobby Cox 24 61 92 0.663 Frank Robinson 16 46 92 0.500 Don Zimmer 13 52 88 0.591 Phil Garner 13 62 85 0.729 Jack McKeon 14 58 85 0.682 Jeff Torborg 11 44 85 0.518 Bobby Valentine 14 45 82 0.549 Felipe Alou 13 56 80 0.700 Earl Weaver 15 49 79 0.620 Don Baylor 9 49 77 0.636 Tom Trebelhorn 7 47 75 0.627 Bruce Bochy 11 51 76 0.671 Gene Mauch 16 43 74 0.581 Davey Johnson 13 52 73 0.712 Art Howe 13 46 68 0.676 Bill Virdon 14 42 68 0.618 Roger Craig 10 29 66 0.439 Rene Lachemann 9 37 60 0.617 Buddy Bell 8 39 58 0.672 Pat Corrales 10 35 55 0.636 Terry Collins 5 40 52 0.769 Danny Ozark 8 41 50 0.820
From a frequency point of view, Ray Knight takes the top spot for those managers who managed more than two seasons at 11 attempts per season while new Cubs manager Lou Pinella comes in fourth at 8.9 just ahead of Billy Martin. As you might expect, Martin was not very aggressive with his veteran Detroit teams of the early ’70s, nor with Texas or the Yankees the first go’round. With Oakland, however, he called for 28 double steals in 1980 and 21 in 1982 where he was successful 17 times. On the other end of the spectrum, no one was more conservative than Ralph Houk who signaled for just 11 double steals in his 13 seasons of post-1970 managing and recorded six seasons (1971 with the Yankees, 1974 and 1978 with the Tigers, and 1981, 1983, 1984 with the Red Sox) in which his teams did not attempt a double steal. The leaders and trailers among managers with more than two seasons of experience are shown below.
Manager Years Succ Att Pct Att/Year Ray Knight 3 26 33 0.788 11.0 Terry Collins 5 40 52 0.769 10.4 Buck Rodgers 14 71 135 0.526 9.7 Larry Dierker 4 24 37 0.649 9.3 Lou Piniella 18 111 160 0.694 8.9 Billy Martin 17 102 151 0.675 8.9 Mike Hargrove 14 87 124 0.702 8.9 Don Baylor 9 49 77 0.636 8.6 Steve Boros 3 18 24 0.750 8.0 Whitey Herzog 18 112 141 0.794 7.8 Bob Boone 6 34 47 0.723 7.8 John Wathan 6 27 47 0.574 7.8 Tony LaRussa 28 160 219 0.731 7.8 Jeff Torborg 11 44 85 0.518 7.7 Lloyd McClendon 5 22 38 0.579 7.6 ----------------------------------------------------------- Lum Harris 3 1 1 1.000 0.3 Ralph Houk 13 7 11 0.636 0.8 Joey Amalfitano 3 2 3 0.667 1.0 Eddie Mathews 3 1 3 0.333 1.0 Ken Macha 4 5 5 1.000 1.3 Frank Quilici 4 3 5 0.600 1.3 Vern Rapp 3 1 5 0.200 1.7 Clyde King 4 3 7 0.429 1.8 Eddie Kasko 4 7 8 0.875 2.0 Gene Michael 4 1 8 0.125 2.0 Yogi Berra 6 10 12 0.833 2.0 Terry Francona 6 12 13 0.923 2.2 Leo Durocher 5 11 11 1.000 2.2 Bill Rigney 4 5 9 0.556 2.3 Bob Lemon 9 16 21 0.762 2.3
Calling for double steals is one thing, and being successful another. The following table orders the success percentage for those managers with 40 or more attempts. Interestingly, on the back of his team’s 2006 performance, Scioscia now tops the list at 89.6% with recent irritant Pete Rose coming in second at 85.4%. For whatever reason, be it poor baserunners or poor decision making, Roger Craig (both in 1985 and 1989 he was 0-for-4) and Frank Robinson (he was 4-for-19 in 1976 and 1977 with the Indians) are the only two managers who fell under 50%.
Manager Years Succ Att Pct Mike Scioscia 7 43 48 0.896 Pete Rose 6 41 48 0.854 Cito Gaston 10 36 43 0.837 Danny Ozark 8 41 50 0.820 Whitey Herzog 18 112 141 0.794 Terry Collins 5 40 52 0.769 Sparky Anderson 26 125 170 0.735 Jim Fregosi 14 33 45 0.733 Tony LaRussa 28 160 219 0.731 Phil Garner 13 62 85 0.729 Bob Boone 6 34 47 0.723 Dick Williams 18 68 95 0.716 Davey Johnson 13 52 73 0.712 Mike Hargrove 14 87 124 0.702 Felipe Alou 13 56 80 0.700 Chuck Tanner 19 72 103 0.699 Lou Piniella 18 111 160 0.694 Jack McKeon 14 58 85 0.682 Walter Alston 7 30 44 0.682 Art Howe 13 46 68 0.676 Tom Kelly 15 75 111 0.676 Billy Martin 17 102 151 0.675 John McNamara 18 29 43 0.674 Joe Torre 24 111 165 0.673 Buddy Bell 8 39 58 0.672 Bruce Bochy 11 51 76 0.671 Rene Lachemann 9 36 54 0.667 Jim Leyland 14 67 101 0.663 Bobby Cox 24 61 92 0.663 Frank Lucchesi 7 29 45 0.644 Don Baylor 9 49 77 0.636 Pat Corrales 10 35 55 0.636 Doug Rader 7 26 41 0.634 Tom Trebelhorn 7 47 75 0.627 Earl Weaver 15 49 79 0.620 Hal McRae 6 26 42 0.619 Bill Virdon 14 42 68 0.618 Tommy Lasorda 21 91 151 0.603 Dusty Baker 13 27 45 0.600 Dallas Green 8 24 40 0.600 Don Zimmer 13 52 88 0.591 Gene Mauch 16 43 74 0.581 John Wathan 6 27 47 0.574 Bobby Valentine 14 45 82 0.549 Darrell Johnson 8 24 44 0.545 Buck Rodgers 14 76 145 0.524 Jeff Torborg 11 44 85 0.518 Frank Robinson 16 46 92 0.500 Roger Craig 10 29 66 0.439
The Trends
This leads us into a discussion of the frequency of double-steal attempts wondering how they’ve changed over time. The following graph captures the dual trends of success percentage and attempts per 162 games since 1970.
Following the blue line and using the Y-axis on the left you can see that double steal attempts per 162 games (both teams) remained in the eight to 12 range from the early 1970s through around 1986.
At that point, the numbers rose substantially, reaching a high of over 17 in 1995 before trending downward once more to where that number has hovered between 7.5 and 8.9 since 2003. One would think that this pattern would follow the general historical increase in stolen-base attempts, but interestingly that is not the case. Stolen-base attempts that were not a part of double steals (represented by the dotted line although not scaled to either Y-axis) rose steadily in the 1970s and peaked in 1986 at the time double-steal attempts were beginning to rise.
It would appear that double steals were lagging the general increase in stolen bases perhaps as a late managerial response to increasing success on the basepaths, or simply a kind of fad that soon began to wane.
The yellow line tracked by the Y-axis on the right indicates that from a success standpoint things haven’t changed much in almost 40 years. Percentages did dip slightly in the early to mid 1980s and have been rising slightly since the mid 1990s with lots of variation thrown into the mix.
The Strategy
From a traditional Run Expectancy standpoint, calculating the breakeven percentage for a successful double steal attempt is straightforward. For example, for the period from 1999 through 2002 (the highest offensive environment represented in our data set) the breakeven percentages for a double-steal attempt when attempting to maximize runs with runners on first and second (which make up 79% of double-steal attempts since 1970) assuming the lead runner is put out are:
Outs BE% 0 .639 1 .558 2 .735
In leaner offensive times like those that persisted during much of the rest of the period since 1970, the breakeven percentages would be lower with less than two outs, since making outs on the bases would not have been as costly. For example, in 1980 the breakeven percentages fall to .600 and .530 with zero and one out, and raises slightly to .778 with two outs.
We can then compare this percentage to the actual results shown below for the entire period.
Outs Succ Att Pct 0 638 1127 0.566 1 1587 2258 0.703 2 769 776 0.991
Per the graph shown above, these percentages increase slightly in the period 1993 through 2006.
What is clear from these two tables is that success rates are higher than they technically need to be.
This is a indication that a double steal is probably perceived by players and managers as a more risky play than it actually is from the Run Expectancy standpoint. The primary reason for this is that the benefits from success are still only potential benefits and so remain partially hidden while the cost of failure is immediately obvious. Essentially, humans are reward-seeking and risk-averse.
What’s more interesting, however, is that the table above highlights the disconnect between the actual and perceived value of moving a runner to third base with less than two outs. If it had been the case that managers internalized the much greater run expectancy with a runner on third and one out as opposed to that runner being on second, then we would expect them to take more risks with one out leading to a lower success rate.
As it is, the success rate is lowest with zero outs indicating that managers tend to take more risks with nobody out (there are certainly a percentage of the attempts with no outs that were actually broken hit and run plays, but the play by play data doesn’t reliably allow us to exclude those). Even so, about 16% of the unsuccessful attempts in these scenarios actually results in the runner breaking towards second being thrown out rather than the runner advancing to third. When that is factored in, it drives the break even percentages down a few percentages points further.
Of the remaining 21% of double-steal attempts, 19% of those occur with runners on first and third. The success rates using the same definition used for calculating manager’s success rates (where at least one runner is credited with a stolen base) are as follows:
Outs Succ Att Pct 0 20 70 0.286 1 146 478 0.305 2 349 457 0.764
Here the accounting of success and failure needs to take a different turn. In a delayed-steal situation, which the majority of these events likely fall into and which has been a hallmark of the game since before 1875, a success is actually dictated by whether or not the runner scores or no outs are recorded by the defense. Under that definition the success percentages for these types of double steals increases by 12%, raising the overall success rate to 63%.
Outs Succ Att Pct 0 31 70 0.443 1 195 478 0.408 2 409 457 0.895
What is perhaps the most interesting point in these two tables is the fact that the success rate is so much higher when there are two outs as opposed to zero or one out. At first glance it is not obvious why this should be the case although I’m sure our enlightened readers will provide some clues.
The Minutiae
Of course not all double steals are double steals.
Since 1970 our data set includes 12 instances of successful triple steals with the last of those occurring on October 1, 1987 as the Braves visited the Astrodome in a game that would see nine total stolen bases. In the top of the fourth inning, the Braves loaded the bases with two outs with Jeff Blauser on first, Ken Oberkfell on second and Gerald Perry on third. The Astros then replaced catcher Ronn Reynolds with Troy Afenir and on the first pitch to David Palmer, all three runners broke and all three were safe extending the Braves lead to 3-0. To add insult to injury Afenir, who would catch just 204 big-league innings, allowed a passed ball on the very next pitch which scored Oberkfell before Palmer mercifully struck out. At least Afenir should be glad that the play was only pulled once against him. On July 25, 1930 the A’s executed it twice against the Indians.
And just as there have been successful triple steals, there have been double steals that ended very badly. In our data set we have 11 instances where more than one runner was caught stealing and in once instance it resulted in a triple play. On May 29, 1982 the Yankees were visiting the Twins with the game scoreless in the top of the second inning. After Bobby Murcer and Graig Nettles hit back-to-back singles to start the frame, Roy Smalley struck out with both runners on the move. Sal Butera threw to third base and apparently both runners, not being particularly speedy, stopped. Gary Gaetti at third threw to first base where Kent Hrbek tagged Nettles out. Hrbek then had time to throw to pitcher Terry Felton covering third in time to nab Murcer who had continued on.
The last double caught stealing occurred in 1998 when the Diamondbacks‘ Yamil Benitez was caught stealing at home and Danny Klassen was gunned down at second, both plays made by Brad Ausmus.
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With less than two outs, there are 3 possible outcomes:
1. Runner out at 2B. Recorded as failed double steal.
2. Runner out at home. Recorded as failed double steal.
3. Both runners safe. Recorded as successful double steal.
This is what happens with two outs:
1. Runner out at 2B. Inning over. Recorded as failed SINGLE STEAL
2. Runner out at home. Recorded as failed double steal.
3. Both runners safe. Recorded as successful double steal.
With two outs, the denominator is reduced by the number of times the runner was thrown out at 2B, leading to a much higher success percentage. Could this be the problem?