When I was seven years old, my dad called me into the living room to watch a Phillies‘ great in the twilight of his career-Mike Schmidt. He told me this was the best Phillie ever, and that I should watch him bat. He struck out. I turned to my dad with a look that must have asked, “Really?” My dad explained one of the first facts I ever learned about baseball-he said that guys who hit a lot of homeruns swing really hard, so they strike out a lot, too. That brings us to Ryan James Howard.
Ryan Howard is one of the more fascinating players in baseball. He hits the ball the hardest, but also pretty much the least. On one hand, he has he led the majors in homeruns two of his three full seasons. Part of the reason is that Howard hits the ball hard, very hard. One study of Hit F/X data from April showed that Howard hit the ball 87.9 MPH on average. The next closest was Miguel Cabrera at 86.8 MPH, with the non-pitcher average of 75.1. And that’s for a month in which Howard had a power-outage, hitting only 4 of his current 18 homeruns. On the other hand, Howard is tied with himself for second place for most single-season strikeouts with 199, and is on pace this year to slot fourth on that list-right behind himself with 196.
Baseball Prospectus profiled him in detail last year. However, I’ve decided to update his profile-because I wanted to highlight a few surprising things about Howard that go against the conventional wisdom.
MINOR LEAGUE CAREER
The Phillies drafted Howard in the 5th round of the 2001 draft, and until 2004, he showed budding power and the tendency to strike out a lot. It wasn’t until 2004 when Howard truly began to show the power we see today. He spent the 2004 season at three levels, hitting .297/.386/.647 in 420 PA in AA, .270/.362/.604 in 125 PA in AAA, and .282/.333/.564 in 42 PA in the MLB. That year, he hit a combined 48 HR, which tied him for the most HR in professional baseball. The Phillies already had Jim Thome at first, so they briefly tried an “experiment” in the minors putting Howard in the outfield. The experiment was as laughable as it was short.
2005 AND 2006: ROOKIE OF THE YEAR AND MVP CAMPAIGNS
Howard was mashing in AAA in 2005 (.371/.467/.690), and after getting the call to Philadelphia to replace the injured Thome, Howard won the job quickly. Despite getting only 348 PA, Howard won the Rookie of the Year Award, hitting .288/.356/.567. However, his unintentional walk (UBB) rate was just 7.4%. His walk rate had been a concern going into 2005. Baseball Evolution keenly observed:
The only skill he might want to improve on is the ability to take walks, and that’s something that will come naturally as teams start to pitch around him.
The Phillies dealt away Jim Thome before 2006, leaving first base open for Howard. PECOTA projected Howard to improve to .286/.375/.612, which was pretty shocking considering he was already 26. However, Howard won the MVP award by outperforming PECOTA‘s optimistic projection: he improved his UBB rate to 10.8%, slugged 58 HR, and hit .313/.425/.659.
The biggest surprise in his numbers was his .313 batting average. The reason behind it was his .363 BABIP, which although lower than his minor league BABIP (.370), is extremely high for the major leagues. Yet, in late June 2006, teams started employing the shift against Howard, and his BABIP has never been the same.
2007 AND 2008: EARLY SLUMPS, STRONG FINISHES, AND THE BABIP REDUCTION
PECOTA projected Howard to hit .299/.393/.616 in 2007, but Baseball Prospectus’ 2007 Annual warned that this may be short-lived:
Historically, players like Howard, big-bodied guys with limited defensive skills such as Mo Vaughn and Boog Powell, tended to have high but brief peak periods.
Howard started off the year struggling, hitting just .221/.396/.390 by the end of April. He had a brief trip to the disabled list, which seemed to do the trick, and he finished at .268/.356/.567, with 47 HR in 529 AB. Howard improved his UBB rate to 11.8%, but he also increased his strikeout rate from 25.7% of PA to 30.7%. Facing more of the defensive shifts that started appearing in mid-2006, Howard’s BABIP dropped to .336. Even more dramatically, his BABIP on groundballs fell from .250 to .187.
Howard started slow again in 2008. By May 7, he was hitting .163/.286/.333. His K-rate was 34%, and his BABIP was .203. Howard was able to raise his BABIP to .285 by the end of the year, and finished the year at .251/.339/.543. This was a far cry from 2006, but he still hit 78 XBH. His K-rate fell back to 32.6%, as well, largely due to an increase in how often he swung (45.4% in 2007, 48.7% in 2008), as he only increased his contact rate from 64.7% to 66.5%.
Digging deeper into Howard’s performance shows us what we think we know about him is very different than what is actually true. In the next three sections, we will correct a few misconceptions about him, so that we can work towards projecting him.
AVERAGE AGAINST LEFTIES, WILL EAT YOUR RIGHTHANDERS
It has been recited many times that Howard’s career OPS is a full .300 points lower against LHP. This has turned into what I called this off-season “The Ryan Howard Can’t Hit Lefties Myth.” Opposing teams believe this too, as the following table of Howard’s percentage of PA against LHP versus the MLB average each year shows:
YEAR Howard% MLB% 2005 18 28 2006 32 28 2007 38 27 2008 38 27 2009 40 27
However, take a look at these charts of career OPS against same-handed pitchers (SHP) on the left, and against opposite handed pitchers (OHP) on the right, among the 27 current non-switch hitting starting first baseman.
Howard is actually not unusual in his performance against same-handed pitchers, as he’s right around the middle of the pack. On the other hand, Howard gives Pujols a run for his money against opposite-handed pitching! And even though Howard is in the middle of the pack against same-handed pitching, he has led the NL in HR vs. LHP in two of the last three seasons. The lesson we should draw from this is not that Howard is freakishly bad against same-handed pitching-he’s actually about average among first basemen; rather, the lesson is that Howard, like Pujols, is freakishly good against opposite-handed pitching.
THERE IS CLUTCH?
I documented something unusual recently-there is such a thing as clutch-okay, at least that’s what I called the article to get attention. What I meant is the following:
Due to the location of first base (the right side of the infield), teams employ large shifts for left-handed power hitters when it is possible, frequently placing three infielders on the right side of the diamond. However, when there are runners on base, it is more difficult to position infielders in such a way that minimizes the hitter’s chance of hitting safely if he hits the ball in play. The result is that for a given batting average, a left-handed power hitter is actually more likely to get those hits when runners are on base. These are naturally higher leverage situations in general. Hence, a given batting line for a left-handed power hitter is more valuable than the equivalent batting line for right-handed power hitters.
While Howard was not one of the players in my study, he fits quite well. The MLB cumulatively had a BABIP .006 better with men on than when bases were empty in 2008. Howard is different. He has fared far better with runners on base ever since teams started employing the shift against him. Look at the change after 2006:
YEAR BABIP (bases empty) BABIP (men on) 2005 .373 .333 2006 .387 .318 2007 .309 .344 2008 .218 .347 2009 .289 .279
Obviously 2008 is a bit extreme and 2009 is not showing this trend, but 2007 is very much in line with the kinds of numbers I saw for hitters like Ortiz, Bonds, and Giambi in my earlier study. Thanks to the ways teams use the shift (and without any voodoo or secret sauce from Joe Morgan), Ryan Howard is clutch.
OPPOSITE FIELD POWER VS. COMPARABLES
In projecting Ryan Howard’s future, there is a lot to be concerned about. Baseball Prospectus warned in 2008:
Howard’s PECOTA comparables suggest the system doesn’t expect him to have a long battery life, a reflection of his late start and old-player skills. Still, Howard is a better hitter than any of those guys.
The reason PECOTA is successful developing comparables from both statistics and body type is because players who are shaped similarly are likely using similar muscles and reflexes to succeed, and determining how comparably constructed players aged is useful in projection. PECOTA sees Howard around .270/.370/.550 through 2011, and then losing power from 2012-2015 at .260/.360/.520.
Beyond just being better than his comparables as BP2008 mentions, there is one area where Howard is extraordinarily different than his comparables. Howard does not hit his homeruns in the same location as his comparables. As early as 2005, Baseball America wrote:
When you have power like him, you don’t have to pull it. It’s not like any park can hold him.
As pitchers try to throw outside, Howard frequently won’t bother pulling the ball. Consider the following plot of the percent of homeruns that were pulled among Howard’s PECOTA comparables (who have homerun location data), as well as other comparables listed on baseball-reference.com. Howard has pulled only 20.5% of his homeruns in his career; the rest of his comparables averaged around 48.6%.
On the other hand, look at the percent of homeruns hit to the opposite field. Howard tops this group by far as well-hitting 26.7% of his homeruns the other way, versus his comparables’ average of 10%.
In determining which of his comparables Howard is most likely to follow as he ages, I decided to see whether the guys who hit more opposite field homeruns aged differently than those who pulled the ball. It appears that guys like Thome, McGriff, and Clark aged a little better and hit fewer homeruns to the opposite field. Other players, like Cecil Fielder and Steve Balboni pulled more homeruns and aged less gracefully. Therefore, Howard may age better than PECOTA expects.
2009 AND THE DEFENSIVE RESURGENCE
Howard has played very poor defense throughout his career, but has struggled most with his throwing. He made 45 errors in 2006-08 (19 last year), and 14 of those 45 were throwing errors.
Howard worked hard on his defense this offseason. He increased his mobility in the field by checking into spring training twenty pounds lighter, and improved his throwing as well. His hard work has paid off, as he has made only one error this season. Further, despite averaging only .618 assists per game in his career, Howard has .732 thus far this year.
LOOKING FORWARD
Due to permanent defensive adjustments, Howard’s BABIP reduction is real. That said, I think his power is unlikely to diminish any time soon, as he continues to hit as many long flyballs as ever. Howard has tried to curb his strikeouts by swinging more often, so his UBB rate has fallen to 9.4%. Putting it all together, PECOTA is probably a little high on his AVG and OBP, and probably low on his SLG-I see him as a .260/.355/.570 hitter. I also suspect he may last a little bit longer than PECOTA thinks, but the key to this will be Howard’s weight. The hitters among his comparables that were larger tended to age more quickly. If he can keep the weight off, he should manage to lead the league in homeruns a few more times over the next several years.
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I'm concerned about the point on pulled homers, since in making the point Matt's invited the (as yet unanswered) question about whether or not there's a park effect involved. Would this be an instance of Howard making an adaptation to his environment that other hitters don't have the advantage of trying and seeing any success?
Also, the word count's fine, but I think between the graphics and the chopping up of the narrative flow, there's an impression generated that he ran long. That said, I'd say the piece suffers from over-segmentation, which should not obscure the quality of the work done.
I think the Phillies are going to have a very tough decision when it's time to resign Howard, because I don't think he's just going to fall off the face of the earth.
Some arguments refuse to die, and I'm firmly with the Sheehan on this one.
I'll put it to you another way about the splits issue...I understand it would be great to have a RHB-Lefty Masher, but even if they did have a lefty masher who could player a corner position, wouldn't you pull Ibanez instead? He's got a lower career OPS against lefties (.754 Ibanez instead of .770 Howard). In fact, so do a lot of guys. Or wouldn't you rather spend the roster spot on a lefty for Werth (.753 vs RHP)? It's just not worth the roster spot. The best thing to do is except that you have a guy who turns into Corey Hart vs lefties and turns into Albert Pujols vs righties, and figure it's still worth keeping Corey Hart on most rosters.
The one thing I see with Howard is that he really loves to swing 3-2 and has been awful that way. I think opposing teams have noticed.
.156/.391/.188/.571 with no homers and 13 walks.
Not sure what is making him feel like he has to swing 3-2, but I think that is what REALLY pulls his OBP down. Take the walk big man.
It does add a new perspective too it though.
That being said, that section was the only one I didn't really like, and this article received my vote. Well done.
Now, if you had only used those comparables for the platoon discussion, instead of current starting first basemen. Nobody cares that Howard is clearly better than Ishikawa, Overbay, Kotchman, Butler, et al. Still, great job.
Thome vs LHP: .239/.342/.423 (.766)
Howard vs LHP: .227/.309/.457 (.766)
Thome vs RHP: .295/.431/.618 (1.049)
Howard vs RHP: .309/.409/.658 (1.066)
And Thome was the guy who smashes all the opposite field homeruns too! I'm glad you got me to check that.
Take the data on the shift where Matt suggests that the shift hurts Howard's BABIP. Then he notes that teams are less likely to use a shift with runners on base and draws on an article suggesting lefthanded jitters perform better in clutch situations because of runners on base. That's a neat idea but then matt provides 5 years worth of Howard's BABIP data and tosses away two years of the data? Then there is the SHP chart that places Howard between previously part-time players/platoon players like Branyan and Cantu? Finally after all the comparisons to players of similar body type, there's a tack-on discussion of defense and the weight Howard lost.,. but the weight loss factor doesnt't appear in the other discussions about his hitting?
I think the opposite field home run part worked best for me, especially on the theory that players lose bat speed as they age so it stands to reason that players like Howard who are used to hitting opposite field home runs might retain more of their skills.
Overall, I liked the ideas used to analyze Howard but I'm not convinced the conclusions apply.
Since 2007:
BABIP with bases empty: .264
BABIP with runners on: .337
Before 2007:
BABIP with bases empty: .377
BABIP with runners on: .327
It's just that doesn't prove my point. In fact, the difference for 2007-2009 with bases empty and runners on is statistically significant. It's just that I wouldn't buy analysis like that unless I had done a larger study.
Thanks
Not that this week was my favorite BP Idol topic either...
I tallied Howard at home:
29% pull
49% center
22% oppo
meaning that Howard on road:
19% pull
68% center
14% oppo
I counted up LCF and RCF is CF. I'm not sure if that's what B-R does for LCF and RCF, but I guess that this seems like Howard probably doesn't have too much of a park effect on his homeruns.
Granted, over his career Howard has hit almost as well on the road as at home--with more home runs by raw count--but Citizens Bank Park was such a hitter's park early in Howard's career that I'd've expected some passing mention of how it affected Howard's stats...especially given that word count seemed not to be an issue.
As an aside, given how long the article seemed, I did a word count, and it came to 1,998 excluding words in charts and tables. The trouble I have is that words in charts and tables, if anything, slow down the reader more than words in the paragraphs forming the body of the work. Counting words in charts and tables put this piece over 2,100 words, and it seemed even longer to me as a reader.
The issue with "clutch hitting" because of higher BABIP with runners on base isn't new. BABIP jumps from .295 to .313 this year in the NL going from the "no baserunners" state to the "runner on first" state. That's normal for all hitters, even if it's a bit more pronounced for Howard.
Finally, the expectations regarding Howard's future are based on some very small-sample trends, as well as some spotty data: how reliable are listed weights for large MLB sluggers? Frankly, given the names included as Howard's comparables and the era in which many of them played, one is almost compelled to wonder if overlooking steroid use, effects, and aftereffects is enough to make gauging the future of Howard by this list of comparables an act of guesswork.
Many readers have voiced their strong support of this piece. Rereading it a day later, though, doesn't change my assessment: others did significantly better on this topic. I'm sure that Matt will be back next week, and I look forward to a strong article, but this one didn't earn a thumbs up from me for the reasons cited here.
The BABIP with runners on base is not normal for all hitters at all. I have done research on this topic in the past-- click on the link in the piece. There's a statistically significant difference between LH and RH power hitters in terms of how they do with BABIP depending on whether runners on base. Howard fits the mold perfectly. As far as I know, that is not something other people have researched before. It has to do with the shift. Additionally, the .313/.295 split you cite is the largest of those kinds of splits and not comparing apples to applies in the first place-- there is a .299/.294 split with runners on base/bases empty which is the split I was using. Generating a .073 point difference instead of a .005 point difference since 2007 is significant, especially given my other study which showed how much better LH power hitters do with runners on base compared to their RH counterparts.
I'm not really sure what the steroids issue has to do with things. I guess it means that his comparables aren't necessarily a good approximation of his aging curve...which was my point.
Certainly your linked work regarding the success of eight left-handed power hitters was interesting, but Howard apparently differs far more from the mean for the group of LHH you studied than he does from the mean of all MLB players. (As an aside, almost the entire effect you discovered was the result of just three players in the sample set: Bonds, Ortiz, and Giambi.) Also, much of the effect for Howard is the effect of the first baseman's holding a runner at first with second base open, the effect I regarded as previously well-known.
Regarding steroids, it's unusual that a given player would have quite so many of his PECOTA comparables either directly linked to PED use or as hitters who peaked in the "Steroid Era," regardless of personal usage. I'd suggest that careers seemed longer for power hitters in particular during those years, and that changes in the game--either drug testing or otherwise, such as possible changes in the baseball itself--may mitigate against Howard's managing "to lead the league in homeruns a few more times over the next several years." That's just opinion, of course, but not many players have quite so great a concentration of comparable players at that time. Notably, though, in 2009 the current PECOTA shows Howard more comparable to several players from before the Steroid Era, including Mike Epstein, Jim Gentile, Willie Aikens, Boog Powell, John Mayberry, and Don Mincher. As a group, these players did not excel once past their twenties, as Howard will be next year when he turns 30 this November.
The effect of the first baseman holding the runner on probably is not enough to explain this difference. LHB have only a .004 BABIP higher than RHB this year, and that even takes into account the fact that C/2B/3B/SS have lower BABIPs because they are harder positions to play and also position that guys who at least throw right-handed can play.
I'm not sure what to make of the fact that Bonds, Ortiz, and Giambi showed the largest splits. I think it's just noise, given the distribution of differences.
As for the steroids issue, I guess it's not surprising that any slugger has a lot of steroid users among his comparables. It's hard to hit homeruns. :-) Howard's presumed non-use of steroids might not hurt him in terms of aging. I don't know the medicine of it, but would players who used steroids in their 20s really age better? I could see the argument that a few guys used them in their mid-to-late 30s to extend their careers, but I don't think that would be the effect. I'd love Will Carroll or someone to inform.
***
The BABIP differences with runners on base from your sample were as follows:
Name (BABIP without baserunners, BABIP with baserunners, difference)
Jason Giambi (.327, .277, +.051)
Barry Bonds (.308, .267, +.041)
David Ortiz (.324, .283, +.041)
Todd Helton (.346, .327, +.019)
Ken Griffey (.297, .285, +.012)
Jim Thome (.327, .317, +.010)
Carlos Delgado (.303, .303, .000)
Larry Walker (.331, .332, -.001)
I don't see it as noise, given the distribution of the differences; I see it as a clear bimodal distribution of two sets, one with a median of .010 and the other with a median of .041, not as a single set with a mean of .022. Frankly, given the frequency of extreme shifts for these various players, a bimodal distribution might make your point regarding Howard better: I think that Bonds, Giambi and Ortiz have had extreme infield shifts played against them more often than the other five players you mentioned.
But I'd expect, then, for Howard to show a decline in overall BABIP on ground balls concurrent with the fairly swift introduction of the shift in 2007, making a higher overall BABIP in clutch circumstances possible. Here are the numbers:
Year / Howard's BABIP on GB
2004 .237
2005 .234
2006 .240
2007 .245
2008 .236
2009 .234
I don't see any change coinciding with the introduction of the shift.
Eric Seidman attributed Howard's high BABIP with runners on base as indicative of his disproportionate ability to make pitchers pay for mistakes, and the correlation between pitchers' mistakes and runners already being on base. There may be merit to that concept, too.
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=8111
2004: .200 (2 for 10)
2005: .200 (19 for 95)
2006: .250 (43 for 172)
2007: .187 (20 for 107)
2008: .163 (28 for 172)
2009: .221 (15 for 68)
That seems to show the trend a little more clearly, though there's a lot of noise there. With less noise by clumping it together: 2004-2006 is .231 and 2007-2009 is .182.
The eight lefties could be a bimodal distribution though it's very hard to know with only eight players in there. I don't remember if people shifted a lot for Larry Walker. Delgado and Thome, though, I'm pretty sure they did and they didn't have large samples. It's tough to tell with this data, but aggregating seems to show the point.
I must also confess that I got lost in the "There is clutch" discussion. "Ryan Howard is clutch" or does Howard just hit better when he is not facing the shift, much like other LH power hitters? Introducing the concept of "clutch" seems to confuse the issue.
That would echo the format of the SHP/OHP presentation.
As to the clutch discussion, the word clutch was intended in the original article to stir the pot. I think that too much of the clutch discussion has been dominated by one side attributing mystical powers to certain people and the other side saying that these guys are all robots. In reality, I felt that certain traits make people more likely to succeed in higher leverage situations.
When a player who is frequently platooned plays against a pitcher of the opposite hand, it is usually because that type of pitcher isn't all that much more effective against opposite handed batters. Hence, Howard's OPS vs. OHP is skewed towards the easier to hit OHP compared to others in the list who are platooned less often.
Serious studies have shown that the platoon effect is really under the control of the pitcher far more than the batter.
No, I'm not convinced of Howard's "clutch" by your evidence. I only see how it only shows how effective the shift has been against him. And, why the heck are we using BABIP to prove clutch in the first place? Why take out home runs when that is more clutch than having you hits drop where they aint.
The home run direction section was interesting, but required a more precise explanation as to the criteria for how those particular home run hitters were picked.
By far the most interesting tidbit here is that home run hitters who hit more opposite side homers last longer than those who do not. I would like to see more on that, although, granted this is supposed to be about Ryan Howard.
Writing A-
Please, keep the number of decimals consistent. It is messier and more difficult to read if they are not all lined up.
Otherwise, a nice read.
Howard is not "clutch." As I said in the article, "I documented something unusual recently—there is such a thing as clutch—okay, at least that's what I called the article to get attention. What I meant is the following..." and then I explained how LH sluggers have more success in high leverage situations due to limits in opposing teams' ability to shift. That's why I used BABIP. The article I link to explains that LH sluggers have the same differences that RH sluggers do in their HR, BB, and K rates with runners on and bases empty.
The hitters I selected for Howard's comparables were just the subset of players on PECOTA's list of comparables and Baseball-Reference.com's list of comparables who played after the era in which HR location was regularly recorded.
But, we also know that Howard has the ability to spray home runs to every part of the ballpark. If he has the ability to stay with the pitch as well as pull it, why couldn't he be more effective against the shift?
Simply put, if you're able to go the other way with a pitch, and they're giving you the the left side of the infield, shouldn't you be able to exploit that?
Perhaps only his flyballs are evenly distributed but his groundballs are all pulled?
You're also right that Howard pulls almost all of his groundballs, but if he is able to go the other way with a pitch, he usually lifts it. He has a career line of .420/.409/1.147 going the other way with 52 HR in 252 PA.
So more than 20% of the time he does hit the ball the other way, it leaves the park. League average is about 1.5% of balls hit the other way leave the park.
A future subject might be to study the effectiveness of the defensive shift in baseball and if there are hitters who've been able to exploit it (although once exploited its use would cease, one would think).
In determining which of his comparables Howard is most likely to follow as he ages, I decided to see whether the guys who hit more opposite field homeruns aged differently than those who pulled the ball. It appears that guys like Thome, McGriff, and Clark aged a little better and hit fewer homeruns to the opposite field. Other players, like Cecil Fielder and Steve Balboni pulled more homeruns and aged less gracefully. Therefore, Howard may age better than PECOTA expects.
I am hitch hiking!