The Braves‘ offensive explosion last night was good for a hang-on 9-7 win over the Houston Astros, but it may have come a bit too late, as it followed a devastating hitting week that saw them squander some of the best starting pitching you’ll see a team get in one swing through the rotation. Starting last Friday against the Reds, the Braves got five straight quality starts, their starters allowing just seven runs in 36 innings, going at least seven innings every night. All told, their pitchers allowed 13 runs in 47
The Braves went 1-4 in those five games, scoring seven runs, with no more than two in any contest. Legends such as Kip Wells-pitching for his seventh team in four years-and Felipe Paulino put the Braves’ bats in lockdown, helping push the team seven games behind the Rockies in the wild-card chase and effectively ending their shot at the postseason. It was a waste of resources even the federal government could take pride in, perhaps a permanent counterexample to the phrase “pitching is [DUMB_NUMBER] percent of baseball.”
When a team racks up 1.4 runs per game, singling out any one player for blame is a bit foolhardy. Let’s be foolhardy and note that Garret Anderson went 1-for-12 in that stretch, sitting out two of the games. His lone hit was a single, his lone other success getting in the way of a pitch, for an .083/.154/.083 slash line. This example of veteran leadership yanked Anderson’s numbers down to .278/.314/.421 on the season, making him almost exactly a league-average producer at the plate (.258 EqA). As consistent as they come, this performance would mark the fourth time in five seasons that Anderson’s EqA has landed within three points of league-average, and it’s also within three points of his PECOTA weighted-mean forecast of .261. He’s played slightly more than PECOTA projected him to play, a point that would weigh more in his favor if his doing so was helping.
While Anderson was hitting, professionally, for a 237 OPS as his team sank into the Atlantic, another left fielder, also a free agent last winter, was also watching his team lose four of five. Well, not “watching” so much as “doing a lot to try and prevent it.” Adam Dunn, playing first base in the absence of the traded Nick Johnson, hit .364/.391/.364 during the five days in question, in the lineup for all nine innings every day. That’s an unusual stretch for Dunn, who is currently going through a power outage that has seen him go without an extra-base hit since August 29, and without a double since August 20. Even at that, he’s been a productive hitter, with a .372 OBP and .431 SLG in the three weeks since his last two-bagger. For the year, Dunn is hitting .282/.411/.557, making him the fifth-best hitter in the league with a .327 EqA and 105.2 Equivalent Runs produced. This is the best offensive year of Dunn’s career to date, thanks to slight improvements in strikeout rate and batting average on balls in play, and better power once you consider his move to DC. He’s outperformed both his recent seasons and approached his 90th-percentile PECOTA projection.
Dunn was a free agent for a long time last winter, eventually signing a two-year contract on February 11 that is paying him $20 million total, and $8 million in 2009. Eleven days later the Braves, who may have had Dion James leading their depth chart at that point, signed Anderson to a one-year deal for $2.5 million. They saved $17.5 million over two seasons, and just $5.5 million in 2009, by filling their left-field hole this way. Dunn has produced 61 batting runs above replacement, or 48 more than Anderson. Forty-eight runs is just shy of five wins in a vacuum, and for a team so desperate for offense, for OBP, and for a middle-of-the-order hitter, Dunn would have been worth even more than that to the Braves, as his plate appearances would have been more valuable than the average player’s. Even if it’s five wins, those five wins would put the Braves two games behind the Rockies-and four behind the Phillies-with a little more than three weeks to play. Make the minor assumption that one of those five might have come at the Phillies’ expense, and it’s easy to see the Braves, led by Dunn, making our September a lot more interesting.
To repeat, the decision to sign Garret Anderson rather than Adam Dunn saved the Braves $5.5 million this year. The decision may have cost them ten times that, however. What’s a post-season berth worth in direct revenues, or indirect revenues? What’s an extra 2,000 people a night coming to the park just in the last homestand add to the till? What’s one series win, advancing to the NLCS, do for the coffers? The decision to sign Anderson instead of Dunn may well be the difference between going to the playoffs and not, and it stands out as one of the most penny-wise, pound-foolish decisions in recent memory. The Braves went cheap because they cared more about the cash commitment then about the impact on the field, and it went about as badly as it could: Anderson gave them exactly what they paid for, and the difference between him and a real left fielder may well be the difference between success and failure in 2009. It was the kind of decision you make running a corner grocery, not a baseball team, and the outcome was predictable on February 22.
I’ve focused just on offense here, which is mildly shortsighted given that it’s Adam Dunn we’re talking about. Plus/minus calls the two even this year as outfielders, while Ultimate Zone Rating indicates a small edge for Anderson in left field. Dunn has cost his team runs at first base as well. However, I’m comparing him to a 37-year-old who played about 40 percent of the time as a DH in his last season in the AL, and who is someone who routinely gets lifted for a defensive replacement. Anderson may be better than Dunn, but he’s not good. You don’t sign Garret Anderson because you’re looking for glove, not when you have Josh Anderson and Gregor Blanco in the room.
If the Braves have Dunn, do they trade for Nate McLouth at midseason, or deal Jeff Francoeur for Ryan Church? Both deals made the team slightly better this season, maybe by about win total, so even if they elect to do both they’re ahead of the game. McLouth is having a better season defensively-basically average-and has hit for a .281 EqA with the Braves, so he’s been a help. A Dunn signing would have made the Braves less likely to take on McLouth’s contract, which I’m not sure would have been such a bad thing in the long term. In any case, the benefits of having Dunn would have outweighed the short-term gains made in the trades.
I’m focused on the Braves here because of just how stark the difference between having Dunn and having Anderson would be in terms of their chances. You could actually make the argument that not signing Dunn was the critical decision of the winter for a number of teams, given the gap between his performance and what they’ve gotten from their left fielders or first basemen or DHs. The Giants have one above-average hitter, and have gotten .332 OBP and .391 slugging from their left fielders, and .323/.422 from their first basemen. Dunn would have them leading the wild-card race. In retrospect, nothing would have saved the Mets‘ season, but Dunn would have helped a team whose left fielders slugged .418. The Mariners went with Ken Griffey Jr. instead of Dunn, and have gotten a .325 OBP and .404 SLG from their DHs. Dunn puts them in both the wild-card and AL West races.
No team will regret the decision to pass on Dunn more than the Braves will, however. As they limp home in front of a half-empty ballpark, headed for elimination, it is impossible to not look at the decision to save $5.5 million, a pittance in baseball finance, and wonder how it might have been different.
Perhaps someday MLB will encourage the purchase of teams by ownership groups who understand that the benefits of running a franchise aren’t in the annual bottom lines, but in the intangible benefits of the property as you operate it and the financial gains when you sell it. Until that time, however, the game will be ill-served. No amount of revenue sharing, draft slotting, or complaining about market size will overcome the damage done by owners who just don’t give a damn.
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The Tigers are in first place and its been fun...but the popgun attack they've featured for most of the season is the primary reason the Twins still have a pulse left in this race. Dunn's bat would have sealed this thing up already I think.
But I feel Dombrowski was paralyzed a bit by the economy and was not going to take on Dunn even at a cut rate (assuming Dunn would have signed in DET) given the malaise in Southeastern Michigan's economy.
I'm not sure, in other words -- although I love this piece -- that the Braves, or anyone else who didn't sign Dunn, or anyone else who didn't even trade for him at the deadlines, "regret" their decision at all.
I'm not sure Dunn was an obvious fit given the Tigers had Ordonez, Sheffield and Guillen for big money. Where could you have played him prior to the Sheffield release? I'm not arguing against the idea, just saying there's a logjam of contracts.
Per Cot's, the Braves' Opening Day payroll in 2009 was $96,726,166.
So let's not make it sound like Liberty Media went all Daniel Snyder on the market. They lopped John Smoltz ($14MM), Mark Teixeira ($12.5MM/~$8MM paid out), Tom Glavine ($8MM), some fraction of Mike Hampton ($15.98MM, but not all theirs) and Mark Kotsay ($7MM/~$6MM paid out) off the payroll.
The acquisitions they made didn't amount to a spending spree. They merely dragged the payroll to about where it was in '08.
All arguments about what Liberty could "afford," or the economy, or the possibility that they would lose money, are what I'm addressing in the last part of the piece. There's no risk here of bouncing checks; the risk is short-term small-number negative cashflow on an asset that is constantly appreciating and providing massive tax benefits to the corporation. If you're making bad baseball decisions based on trying to avoid a seven-figure loss, just sell already. This is one of the biggest problems facing so many teams today, this silly fear of red ink in a single season. If the appetite for risk is that small, get out of the business.
I really think I'm on solid ground with this, and I don't understand the relentless defense of ownership groups, corporate and otherwise, based on a fear of losing money. If you can't stand to lose money, buy savings bonds. Running baseball teams this way is bad for the industry, and awful for the individual fan bases.
It seems like there is some sort of disconnect in there somewhere. If you would consider exploring that topic, that would be outstanding. I know they had no chance at re-signing Sabathia, but was there nothing they could have done other than "defer"?
Sorry to stray so far off-topic..
Both good players with obvious reasons to compare them, but 99 out of 100 would take Howard over Dunn
Given the economy last off-season, I'm not going to haul off on a team signing/trading-and-paying-for only Lowe+Vazquez, rather than Lowe+Vazquez+Dunn.
First, the premise that it was "only" $5.5MM more ignores the elephant in the room - the economy. There simply is no evidence that, at the time these moves were made, the Braves COULD afford the extra payroll. Every move they've made has not increased payroll. Even trading for McLouth was offset by not activating Glavine - who would have commanded a $1.5MM bonus his first day on the roster. Church makes less than Francoeur and the difference between Kotchman and LaRoche was paid by the Red Sox. I have always had an issue with Yankees fans evaluating the payroll decisions on other teams simply because there is no context for Yankees fans - of course they can easily afford the extra $5.5MM. Their team has no budget. But reality is that most teams operate at a budget and most teams can't easily blow past that budget "just because". And, as the attendance in Atlanta showed this summer, even when the Braves were still "in" the WC race, the fans did not come out meaning any extra salary would not have assuredly been offset by added revenue.
Second, because of the budget, what cost the team Dunn (whom many Braves' fans did want) was acquiring all 3 of Lowe ($15MM), Vazquez ($11.5MM) and Kawakami ($7.7MM). All winter talk was made of 2 SP and a power-hitting LF. Offense was the major weak issue for this team all winter but they wanted to focus on SP, which was also a weakness. Had they just gotten 2 of the 3, then the money would have been there for Dunn. But, for whatever reason, they signed all 3. And that left them budget shopping for a LF. That is why there was no talk of even Abreu - just Griffey and then Anderson. Again, moves like Anderson for Dunn do not happen in a vacuum. The 3rd SP "cost" them Dunn - not being "cheap".
Third, let's presume they only sign 2 of the 3 SP so that they can afford Dunn (and stay on budget) - where is the analysis that shows where the team would be in the WC race if they take away the worst of the SP and replace with someone like Glavine, Jo-Jo Reyes or even Medlen (at least until Hudson was ready to return)?
Whether it was the right way to spend the $40-45MM they spent this winner, the 3 SP were a reason this team stayed in the race, a feat not many fans expected to even be possible as the off-season began. Replacing one of them to enable them to sign Dunn does not result in a situation in which they would be in any better shape. But, of course, that type of analysis isn't as fun to write.
However, if one wished to focus on a team being cheap, here's one analysis to consider - how much did the Braves lose keeping Hanson at AAA to avoid Super 2 while running a mish-mash of garbage out there from mid-April (when a 5th SP was needed) to June 7?
Finally, as to the other OF moves, they likely would have occurred with Dunn in lieu of Anderson. McLouth was obtained since Schafer a) stunk up the joint because b) he hurt his wrist. Dunn can't play LF - he clearly could not play CF. Francoeur and Church both needed new teams. The one move that may not have happened was LaRoche.
Also, as to their post-season chances and their offense, one also has to look at the player whose picture graces this article - if Chipper were even close his weighted mean WARP (2.2 vs 6.3), the Braves playoff picture sans Dunn would be looking much better even with Anderson in LF.
Again, one move in a vacuum does not define the reason this team has struggled to score runs all season and trying to boil down the Braves' failures to a single move seems simplistic to me. Based on the entirety of moves they made, I just can't see how the Braves' owners have been "cheap". They may not have made the "right" moves (using the always wonderful "hindsight is 20/20" standard) - but they did spend plenty of money when most teams did not.
But this seems odd because he then goes on to say that even Dunn's 90th-percentile performance this year (inherently more value than the Braves should have expected to receive in February, even had they valued his skills correctly) would have only gotten them within a couple games of a playoff spot. Had Dunn produced his expected mean value, the Braves would probably be 3-4 out of the wild card spot, more in the division, and so only a couple better than they are right now. It seems unlikely that there would be a big marginal revenue boost in September games, given Atlanta's shoddy attendance history even when successful.
As a Phillies fan, I'm thankful the Braves didn't sign Dunn, because they'd be more of a threat with him than they are now. But I don't think it's entirely fair to fault them for not investing more money, in this economy, into a decision which, at the time, was a real longshot to make a significant marginal impact.
Instead, they needed a rebound from Francoeur, continued improvement from their MI, a solid season from Schafer and no significant drops. Instead, Chipper nose-dived, Schafer got hurt/stank, Francoeur was his putrid 2008 and KJ had a bad season. The trades for McLouth and Church and Prado's emergence simply helped avoid a complete disaster.
So even if they had invested in Dunn AND he performed better than most expected, at best they would still be on the outside looking in as of today.
As an aside, can we please get some copy-editing, at least for the first few paragraphs? I can understand mangled sentences in paragraph 19 slipping through, but not the lead sentence.
I realize it's out of the realm of this exercise, and I don't think many people expected their 1B situation to have been quite this bad... but it is also of some interest to note the circumstances at Texas. Had they signed Dunn to play 1B, or even DH, this move would have had similarly changed the wildcard race in the AL. A quick glance shows approximately 60 VORP improvement for Dunn over the Texan 1Bs (though Dunn's value would change at 1B, as you note).
The Texas circumstance is different than Atlanta's because it is not something that could reasonably have been predicted in the pre-season. However, in retrospect, having Dunn's performance on their side of the ledger would have made a huge difference in the standings. They could be leading their division and/or the wildcard. Let's just call it a "what if..." observation.
The Atlanta situation, however, was more predictable.
But, to roast them on a 2 win differential when they are down 8.5 games in the WC race without accounting for the other moves that would have been needed to enable them to take those two wins in LF? That does not make sense to me. Heck, even if they "should" have predicted the 4 win gap - they would still be 4.5 games out of the WC with 20-21 games to play. I wouldn't be buying my playoff tickets in that scenario either.
A) Resign Adam LaRoche
B) Turn one of Vazquez, Kawakami, or Lowe into a left fielder (through trade, not practice). Lowe is the one I'd most like to move, and also the least likely to actually be moved. In concert with this move, try and sign Tim Hudson to a 2-year contract at a lower annual salary than his 2010 option.
C) Find 4 bullpen arms (free agents, trades, or minors), and convince Cox that he is allowed to use more than just the closer and 2 set-up men in games. One of the biggest reasons the Braves have fallen apart lately has been Cox's overuse of Soriano, Gonzalez, Moylan, and O'Flaherty over the first half of the season. While the Braves rotation has provided innings, the back-end of the Braves bullpen has been extremely overworked because Cox hasn't trusted the front-end of the bullpen in games where the Braves had a lead of 4+ runs.
B) I agree a SP will be traded IF they come to an agreement with Hudson on an extension. Not sure the market on Lowe or Kawakami, though. Also not sure it will be a LF (or OF) if they believe Schafer, McLouth, Diaz and Church can handle the OF for a few months until Heyward is ready. Could see the SP traded for a 1B or possibly a closer.
C) I agree on the pen. Moylan, Medlen and O' Flaherty should be back. MGonz and Soriano are type-A and I could see offering arb to either/both (although I think the safer play is to let them pitch elsewhere due to injury risk due to overuse this season). Regardless, find a closer and possibly another set-up to go with the above 3.
Regardless, it seemed pretty clear all winter that ATL wasn't about to buy a hitter and Anderson was a bone to the crowd. They were crossing their fingers PHI would implode and they could take their chances with the Mets.
First, Dunn's strikeout rate is right about his career average - slightly higher, in fact, and a little higher than what it was last year (using data from FanGraphs).
Second and more importantly, I think Baseball Prospectus needs to put all their best statistical minds together and study the significance of BA/BiP - then educate all of us - including all their writers. My understanding is that when a nine year vet suddenly improves from a carerr BABIP under .290 to .344 (FanGraphs), he is having one heck of a lucky year. He hasn't really improved and is likely to go back to hitting his norms next year - or the rest of that season.
BABIP is too important to ignore, but let's understand it. Maybe I'm wrong, but I thought studies have shown a player is more apt to hit his career BABIP - especially if it is near .300 depending on his speed and line drive rates, then to continue hitting a BABIP far from that norm. In other words, BABIP is not a skill like a walk rate or home run rate which a player can develop.
Dunn has improved his BABIP relative to 2008. If you want to read "improved" as "reached a higher level of native skill," you're welcome to do so. It's fairly clear the word, in context, means "is hitting for a a higher BABIP." BABIP reflects skill for hitters, related to, as you note, speed and line-drive rate.
The strikeout-rate comment is wrong whether you use K/PA or K/AB, which I'll attribute to a math or transcription error. (I didn't use Fangraphs, just did it manually.) He's striking out slightly more this year. Mistake on my part.
:-) Don't ever change, Joe.
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=8535
So I read this article as a bit of in-a-bubble "I told you so," rather than any kind of second-guessing